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ARTICLES
FIDUCIARY  INJURY  AND  CITIZEN  ENFORCEMENT
OF  THE  EMOLUMENTS  CLAUSE
Meredith M. Render*
The text of the Emoluments Clause provides no explicit enforcement mechanism, raising
questions about who may enforce the Clause, and the mechanism by which it might be enforced.
Is the Clause enforceable exclusively by collective action—such as an impeachment proceeding by
Congress—or is it also enforceable by individual action—such as a private lawsuit?  If the
Emoluments Clause can be enforced by private action, who has standing to sue?  In the absence
of explicit textual guidance, a broader constitutional theory is required to render enforcement of
the Clause coherent.
This Article presents that broader theory.  The Article argues that the Emoluments Clause
imposes a fiduciary duty on officers of the United States.  When that duty is breached, all Ameri-
cans suffer an undifferentiated injury, which may serve as the basis for a private cause of action
to enforce the Clause.  Drawing on both the historical and textual context of the Clause, this
Article concludes that enforcement of the Emoluments Clause is a tool that the Constitution
reserves for “the People” as a means of policing the political branches.
The Article then positions this fiduciary injury into the broader question of standing in
constitutional cases.  The Supreme Court’s paramount concern in the context of standing in
constitutional cases is to avoid separation-of-powers conflicts.  That goal is best served by a focus
on primary versus collateral injuries, rather than the Court’s current (and unevenly applied)
“concrete and particularized” standard.  In constitutional cases, a focus on primary injuries is
consistent with much of the Court’s existing standing doctrine and offers a more coherent, parsi-
monious, and elegant approach to standing.  More importantly, a focus on primary injuries
allows the Court to safeguard separation-of-powers principles while avoiding the absurd results
that necessarily follow from the Court’s current posture.
© 2020 Meredith M. Render.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame
Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law.  I am grateful for
exceptionally helpful insights from Heather Elliott, Larry Kramer, Mark Tushnet, David
Fontana, Stephen Galoob, Ronald Krotoszynski, Michael Pardo, Stephen Lee, Andrea
Roth, Beth Colgan, Briana Rosenbaum, Andrew Gilden, Andrea Wang, Seth Barrett
Tillman, Josh Blackman, and participants in the 2018 Grey Fellows Forum at Stanford Law
School.
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INTRODUCTION
The presidency of Donald Trump has ignited much interest1 in the
Emoluments Clause.2  At the time of publication, three separate lawsuits are
pending in federal courts alleging that President Trump’s decision not to
divest from his business holdings prior to his inauguration has resulted in
violations of the Clause.3  The first lawsuit was filed in January 2017 by a
nonprofit watchdog organization known as Citizens for Responsibility and
Ethics in Washington (CREW).4  The second suit was filed in June 2017 by
the attorneys general of Maryland and the District of Columbia (“MD/DC”).5
The third suit was also filed in June 2017 by 196 Democratic members of
Congress (the “DEM” lawsuit).6  The central claims of these complaints are
strikingly similar.7  There is even some overlap among the counsel of record
1 See, e.g., NORMAN L. EISEN ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE: ITS
TEXT, MEANING, AND APPLICATION TO DONALD J. TRUMP 3 (2016), https://www.brookings.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/gs_121616_emoluments-clause1.pdf (“It is widely
accepted that Mr. Trump’s presidency will present a variety of conflicts issues, many of
them arising from his far-flung domestic and global business activities. . . . Indeed, . . . the
possibility of skewed incentives will haunt literally every interaction between the federal
government and any Trump-associated business.”).  It is worth noting that that scholarly
interest in the Emoluments Clause has been recently generated in a related context by
Zephyr Teachout’s use of the Emoluments Clause to support her claim that the Constitu-
tion embodies a structural anticorruption principle—an argument that was cited by both a
dissenting and concurring justice in Citizens United. Cf. Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corrup-
tion Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 359–60 (2009); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310,
391 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 424 n.51 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
2 Two distinct constitutional clauses are sometimes referred to as the “Emoluments
Clause.”  The first appears in Article I, and is also known as the “Ineligibility Clause” or the
“Domestic Emoluments Clause.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.  It applies only to members
of Congress. See id.  It states that members of Congress shall not serve in “any civil Office
under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emolu-
ments whereof shall have been encreased during such time.” Id.  A second “Emoluments
Clause,” also known as the “Foreign Emoluments Clause,” appears at Article I, Section 9,
Clause 8.  It applies to any “Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under” the United
States. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.  When used in this Article, the term “Emoluments Clause” refers
exclusively to the Foreign Emoluments Clause.
3 See Complaint at 18, Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45 (D.D.C. 2018) (No.
17-1154) [hereinafter DEM Complaint]; Complaint at 2, 4, District of Columbia v. Trump,
291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018) (No. 17-1596) [hereinafter MD/DC Complaint]; Com-
plaint at 1, 3, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174
(S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 17-458) [hereinafter CREW Complaint]; Second Amended Com-
plaint at 1, 3, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (No. 17-458)
[hereinafter CREW Second Amended Complaint].
4 CREW Complaint, supra note 3, at 2, 4, 37; CREW Second Amended Complaint,
supra note 3, at 4.
5 MD/DC Complaint, supra note 3, at 1, 7, 44.
6 DEM Complaint, supra note 3, at 17, 19–20, 54.
7 The CREW complaint, for example, complains both of general conflict of interests
concerns and specific possible violations.  General concerns include statements such as:
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in the cases.8  What primarily distinguishes them from one another is the
identity of the plaintiffs.  The three lawsuits represent three distinct—and to
some degree, creative—strikes at the same target: the Article III standing
requirement.9
Specifically, the plaintiff profiles in these three cases have been crafted
to meet the injury-in-fact standing requirement, which proscribes “genera-
lized grievances.”10  It is unsurprising that these plaintiff profiles have been
tailored with an eye to the standing requirement, as the generalized-griev-
ance prohibition will present significant challenge to any emoluments lawsuit
filed against a sitting President.  Article III standing is, of course, a hurdle
that all federal cases must clear, and as a doctrine it has long been criticized
as “incoheren[t],”11 “pointless,”12 and variously inadequate.13  But in the
context of an Emoluments Clause challenge, an unreflective application of
“Defendant owns and controls hundreds of businesses throughout the world, including
hotels and other properties.  His sprawling business empire is made up of hundreds of
different corporations . . . .”  CREW Second Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at 14; see
also id. at 1 (“Defendant’s business interests are creating countless conflicts of interest, as
well as unprecedented influence by foreign governments, and have resulted and will fur-
ther result in numerous violations of [the Emoluments Clauses].’”).  More specific allega-
tions include statements such as: “The Embassy of Kuwait is scheduled to hold its National
Day celebration at Defendant’s Washington, D.C. hotel on February 25, 2017.  A portion of
the funds to pay for this Kuwaiti celebration will go directly to Defendant while he is Presi-
dent.”  CREW Complaint, supra note 3, at 13–14 (footnote omitted).  These specific allega-
tions also appeared in the Second Amended Complaint in updated form: “The Embassy of
Kuwait held its National Day celebration at Trump International Hotel on February 22,
2017,” the cost of which was an “estimated . . . $40,000 to $60,000.”  CREW Second
Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at 20; see also DEM Complaint, supra note 3, at 35, 41
(alleging both general and specific conflicts of interests concerns); MD/DC Complaint,
supra note 3, at 10–11, 13–14 (same).
8 For example, Noah Bookbinder, who is affiliated with Citizens for Responsibility
and Ethics in Washington and is one of the attorneys of record in the CREW lawsuit, is also
an attorney of record in the Maryland and District of Columbia lawsuit. See MD/DC Com-
plaint, supra note 3, at 45; CREW Second Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at 66.
9 The CREW complaint posits standing based on the increased resources that the
organization must expend to monitor President Trump’s business ties.  CREW Complaint,
supra note 3, at 2; CREW Second Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at 4.  On the other
hand, the MD/DC complaint bases standing on, inter alia, the “sovereign and quasi-sover-
eign interests of the District and Maryland.  Maryland has an interest in preserving its role
as a separate sovereign and securing observance of the terms under which it participates in
the federal system.”  MD/DC Complaint, supra note 3, at 6.  The DEM complaint bases its
standing on the unique interest that members of Congress have in enforcing the Clause.
See DEM Complaint, supra note 3, at 53.
10 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 n.3
(2014) (“While we have at times grounded our reluctance to entertain [generalized griev-
ances] in the ‘counsels of prudence’ . . . , we have since held that such suits do not present
constitutional ‘cases’ or ‘controversies.’  They are barred for constitutional reasons, not
‘prudential’ ones.” (citations omitted) (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United
for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982))).
11 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 59 (4th ed.
2011).
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current standing doctrine could serve as a significant obstacle to any lawsuit
seeking to enforce the Clause.14
Against this backdrop, this Article introduces a new critique of standing
doctrine—as well as a new understanding of existing critiques—by revealing
the weaknesses of standing doctrine that are uniquely apparent in the con-
text of an Emoluments Clause challenge to a sitting President.15  This Article
advances two related theses.  The first thesis is that current standing doctrine
fails to adequately account for the fiduciary injury that arises in the context of
an emoluments violation.  The second thesis is that current standing doctrine
undervalues the important and constitutionally committed role that individ-
ual citizen suits play in enforcing constitutional provisions, like the Emolu-
ments Clause, the sole purpose of which is to ensure that those subject to it
will not be tempted to abrogate their duty of loyalty to the United States.
In support of those theses, this Article presents three key insights: first,
that current standing doctrine fails to recognize or address the kind of fiduci-
ary injury that is the primary injury that follows from an Emoluments Clause
violation.  When the Emoluments Clause is violated, a federal officer (such as
the President of the United States) has breached his fiduciary duty to the
people.  When that happens each one of the people suffers an identical fidu-
ciary injury.  However, fiduciary injury is not cognizable under current stand-
ing doctrine, owed to the Court’s categorical exclusion of “generalized
grievances.”
The second key insight is that the Supreme Court’s disinclination to rec-
ognize fiduciary injury represents a substantive, normative preference for
12 Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 75 (2007) (“In many
cases, justiciability rules do no more than act as an apparently pointless constraint on
courts.”).
13 See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663,
1664–65 (2007) (“Standing has been subject to voluminous and sustained criticism over
the past forty years. . . .  Scholars almost unanimously regard it as pointless and incoherent
at best, a veil for ideological manipulations at worst.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Heather
Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 466–68 (2008) (arguing that stand-
ing doctrine is widely criticized because it cannot satisfy the goals that it purportedly
serves).
14 To be clear, Article III standing is likely to be a challenge for any lawsuit that is filed
against a President.  It would not present an obstacle in an impeachment proceeding,
which is a possible but not exclusive (or, under certain circumstances, likely) means of
enforcing the Emoluments Clause, as is discussed infra subsection III.B.3.
15 A nonfrivolous Emoluments Clause challenge to a sitting President was an unprece-
dented event prior to January 2017.  Previous Presidents have been involved in Emolu-
ments Clause issues—for example, President Obama consulted with the Department of
Justice and White House counsel prior to accepting the Nobel Peace Prize. See Applicabil-
ity of the Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act to the President’s
Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, O.L.C. slip op. at 4 (Dec. 7, 2009), https://
www.justice.gov/file/18441/download (concluding that the award was not a gift from a
foreign government, but was instead a gift from the Nobel Foundation).  However, no
sitting President has been the defendant in a nonfrivolous litigation alleging an Emolu-
ments Clause violation.
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“representative constitutionalism” as the principle means by which separa-
tion-of-powers norms are enforced.  The principle of “representative consti-
tutionalism” assumes that separation-of-powers norms are best enforced
through collective action (via elected representatives) rather than individual
action (via individual citizen’s lawsuits).  This assumption is based on either
or both of the following premises: (1) the Constitution itself—either structur-
ally, expressly, or in light of the Framers’ intent—requires collective rather
than individual enforcement of the Clause; or (2) collective action is
pragmatically better suited to safeguard the fiduciary duty enforced by the
Clause, without sacrificing (and while simultaneously protecting) separation-
of-powers norms.  However, neither of these assumptions are justified in the
context of an Emoluments Clause violation.  The available evidence sur-
rounding the Clause suggests that the Framers contemplated a robust and
direct role for the people in enforcing constitutional norms.  Moreover, a
direct role for citizen participation in policing the political branch is particu-
larly apt when the threat to be remediated is external (undue foreign influ-
ence) rather than internal (e.g., the judicial branch usurping the role of the
executive branch).  While the Court’s preference for representative constitu-
tionalism may have merit in other constitutional contexts, it is inapposite in
the context of a fiduciary injury, which itself represents the failure of collec-
tive action to adequately protect the interests of the people.
The third key insight is that “direct constitutionalism,” rather than rep-
resentative constitutionalism, is the principle most suited to redressing an
undifferentiated fiduciary injury in general and in the Emoluments Clause
context in particular.  Direct constitutionalism posits that the Constitution
(structurally, expressly, and in light of the Framers’ intent) requires that “the
People” play a direct role in safeguarding certain democratic norms, and that
as a practical matter, permitting “the People” to play an individual and direct
role is the best means of safeguarding certain democratic norms.16  Thus, the
16 In using the phrase “the People” I refer to the group of people described by the
Court in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez:
[The term] “the people” seems to have been a term of art employed in select
parts of the Constitution.  The Preamble declares that the Constitution is
ordained and established by “the People of the United States.”  The Second
Amendment protects “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,” and the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments provide that certain rights and powers are
retained by and reserved to “the people.”  See also U. S. Const., Amdt. 1 (“Con-
gress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble”) (emphasis added); Art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States”)
(emphasis added).  While this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive, it sug-
gests that “the people” protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and
Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this
country to be considered part of that community.
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principle of direct constitutionalism is a better fit than representative consti-
tutionalism for enforcing the Emoluments Clause.
These arguments are presented in the following format.  Part I offers an
introduction to the Foreign Emoluments Clause, providing a history of the
Clause.  Part I also provides a foundation for the argument that a violation of
the Clause produces a fiduciary injury.  Part II explains how the Supreme
Court’s prohibition of “generalized grievances” operates as an unnecessary
obstacle in the emoluments context by failing to recognize the fiduciary
injury at the heart of an emoluments violation.  By dissecting the primary
injury that follows from an emoluments violation and disaggregating it from
the types of collateral injuries that are the focus of the Court’s standing doc-
trine, this Part reveals that the categorical exclusion of generalized griev-
ances in the emoluments context leads to absurd results.  Part III posits that
the Supreme Court’s avoidance of generalized grievances in the context of
fiduciary injuries represents an unjustifiable preference for representative
rather than direct constitutionalism.  Part III also explains why direct consti-
tutionalism is a better fit with an emoluments violation, both from the van-
tage point of the purpose and history of the Clause, and as a pragmatic
means of enforcing important constitutional and democratic norms.  Finally,
Part IV offers a conclusion.
I. THE FOREIGN EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE IN CONTEXT
Everybody has heard of loyalty; most prize it; but few perceive it to be what, in its
inmost spirit, it really is,—the heart of all the virtues, the central duty amongst all
duties.
—Josiah Royce17
  Article I, Section 9, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, the Foreign Emolu-
ments Clause, states: “No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United
States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them,
shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolu-
ment, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or for-
eign State.”18
494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (omissions in original).  In the context used here, every member
of the community that constitutes “the People” is protected by the Emoluments Clause’s
guarantees, in exactly the same way that every one of the People is protected by the Fourth
Amendment.  Insofar as the Court has identified the term as a term of art (and correctly
so), it is a term of purchase, identifying the party to whom the described benefit is directed.
In the Fourth Amendment context the benefiting party is, literally, “the People,” meaning
each one of the people individually as well as the people collectively.  In that context, it
would be absurd to say that the only way to enforce the Fourth Amendment right of the
people to be secure in their homes is through collective political action—i.e., waiting for
the relevant legislative body to impeach the offending state official.  Such an assertion
would be equally absurd here.
17 JOSIAH ROYCE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOYALTY, at vii (1908).
18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
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It is, in essence, an antibribery provision.19  Although contemporaneous
records discussing the Clause are sparse, what evidence we do have suggests
that the Clause was directed at preserving the independence of “foreign Min-
isters [and] other officers of the U.S.” from “external influence.”20  For
example, William Rawle, writing a commentary on the relatively new Consti-
tution in 1825, described the utility of the Clause in terms of its capacity to
hold foreign influence in abeyance.21  He stated:
There cannot be too much jealousy in respect to foreign influence.  The
treasures of Persia were successfully distributed in Athens; and it is now
known that in England a profligate prince and many of his venal courtiers
were bribed into measures injurious to the nation by the gold of Louis
XIV.22
The “profligate prince” Rawle mentioned is King Charles II (1630 to 1685) of
England.23  A notorious spendthrift, Charles II had difficulty living within the
generous appropriation afforded him by Parliament,24 so he supplemented
his official income by accepting “secret payments from Louis XIV in return
for his agreement to follow France’s lead on certain matters.”25  Charles II
was repeatedly paid large sums by Louis XIV for various types of political
support of France.26
So taken were the Framers with this tale of royal treachery that the For-
eign Emoluments Clause was inserted expressly to prevent an officer of the
United States from putting his own financial interest above the interests of
the nation in the context of foreign affairs.27  The possibility that an officer
of the then-nascent United States would be tempted by the sizable purses of
19 See Teachout, supra note 1, at 366 (discussing the Emoluments Clause as a response
to the worry among Constitutional Convention delegates that a President would be suscep-
tible to bribery from foreign states).
20 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 389 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1937) (“Mr Pinkney urged the necessity of preserving foreign Ministers [and] other
officers of the U.S. independent of external influence and moved to insert . . . [the Emolu-
ments Clause].”).
21 See WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
116 (Philadelphia, H.C. Carey & I. Lea 1825)
22 Id.
23 See generally Clyde L. Grose, Louis XIV’s Financial Relations with Charles II and the
English Parliament, 1 J. MOD. HIST. 177 (1929) (detailing Louis XIV’s successful attempts to
bribe Charles II of England in order to influence English domestic law and foreign policy).
24 Id. at 178 (describing Charles II’s financial situation as “desperate” under the sub-
sidy provided him by Parliament).
25 Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsh, The Appropriations Power and Sovereign Immunity, 107
MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1225 n.145 (2009).
26 See Grose, supra note 23, at 187–88.
27 See EISEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 10 (“Familiar with the corruption of King Charles II
of England by lavish pensions and promises from King Louis XIV, the Framers manifestly
did not see national leaders as immune from foreign influence.”); see also Saikrishna Ban-
galore Prakash, Why the Incompatibility Clause Applies to the Office of the President, 4 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 35, 41 (2009) (“[T]he provision barring Presidents from
accepting foreign emoluments was arguably added to prevent Presidents from being cor-
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established European crowns was a considerable concern of the time.28
While domestic bribery was left to the legislative branch to resolve, the Fram-
ers concluded that bribery from a foreign state posed such a uniquely grave
threat to the survival of the nation that they included the emoluments prohi-
bition among only a tiny handful of criminal and quasi-criminal prohibitions
included in the Constitution itself.29
Arguably, the Framers viewed foreign bribery so severely because they
conceived of it as a malum in se tantamount to (or at least akin to) treason
itself—which would also explain why foreign bribery was singled out and a
prohibition against domestic bribery was left to the legislative branch to
resolve.30  The place of the Clause in the Constitution signals not only the
graveness of the wrong but also that, from the vantage point of the Framers,
conspiring with a foreign state is fundamentally anathema to the solemn duty
of loyalty that attends an “Office of Profit or Trust [held] under [the United
States].”31  A consideration of that duty follows.
A. The Emoluments Clause’s Duty of Loyalty
The Emoluments Clause says nothing about how it is to be enforced or
who is authorized to enforce it.  Yet its function in the constitutional scheme
is clearly to provide a mechanism for enforcing a federal officer’s fiduciary
duty of loyalty to the United States against hostile foreign influence.32  The
threat that the Framers addressed with the Emoluments Clause is more com-
plex than an ordinary problem of political corruption.  It is a problem of
political corruption coupled with the menacing threat of a hostile foreign
state obtaining secret and outsized influence over a person who is elected to
serve the interests of “the People.”  The Clause does not target practices in
which an officer of the United States exploits his or her office for personal
enrichment (e.g., by promoting domestic projects in which he or she has a
financial interest).  It also fails to capture instances in which an officer
rupted by foreign bribes, as occurred when Charles II accepted money from France’s Louis
XIV.”).
28 Teachout, supra note 1, at 366 (“The [Constitutional Convention] delegates were
concerned that the short executive tenure could lead Presidents to be seduced by promises
of future opulence by foreign powers, and give over their country for their own
advantage.”).
29 See id. at 373 (describing the Framers’ worry about corruption as an “obsession”).
30 Treason is one of only three crimes enumerated in the Constitution.  Charles R.
Fritch, Note, Drug Smuggling on the High Seas: Using International Legal Principles to Establish
Jurisdiction over the Illicit Narcotics Trade and the Ninth Circuit’s Unnecessary Nexus Requirement, 8
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 701, 718 n.104 (2009) (“[P]iracy, treason, and felonies on
the high seas[ ] are the only enumerated crimes in the entire Constitution.”).
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
32 The Emoluments Clause is arguably one of several constitutional provisions that
imposes fiduciary duties on government actors. See Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare
Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 52–53
(2003) (“Although the drafters were not utopian enough to create a purely fiduciary gov-
ernment, fiduciary principles pervade the Constitution.”).
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accepts money in exchange for assisting a domestic political ally.  It is
directed exclusively at the external threat of foreign influence.
Further, the Clause does not impose a complete ban on accepting money
from foreign states.33  After all, an officer may keep an emolument if he or
she first receives the consent of Congress.34  Instead, the Clause imposes a
ban on secret, undeclared bribes—the very type of bribe that allowed Charles
II to manipulate Parliament on behalf of Louis XIV.35  Had Parliament been
made aware of the agreements between Charles II and Louis XIV, they would
have understood Charles’s political maneuvering within the context of the
French agenda and could have defended English interests accordingly.36
Similarly, the Emoluments Clause demands that money received from for-
eign states be openly declared and subjected to congressional scrutiny.37
The Clause then is not just directed at corruption per se.38  It is, instead,
specifically directed at loyalty.39  The Emoluments Clause prohibition is ren-
dered sensible only by the understanding that in accepting a foreign bribe, a
federal officer breaches a preexisting duty of loyalty owed to the American
people.40  Moreover, the duty of loyalty that the Clause enforces is a duty of
loyalty to the people of the United States, jealously and exclusively, as against
any external threat.41
I am not claiming that a general common-law fiduciary duty exists
between every federal officer and every citizen.42  The claim is instead much
more circumscribed.  The claim is merely that the Emoluments Clause itself
33 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
34 Id. (stating that no officer can accept an emolument without the consent of
Congress).
35 See Grose, supra note 23, at 187–89 (describing bribes offered to Charles II in return
for not calling Parliament to session).
36 See id. at 180 (describing the secret Treaty of Dover that Charles II hid from the
English people).
37 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (emoluments from foreign states require the consent of
Congress).
38 But see Teachout, supra note 1, at 359–62 (arguing that the Clause supports a
broader, structural anticorruption principle in constitutional doctrine).
39 See, e.g., Christopher M. Petras, Serving Two Masters: Military Aircraft Commander
Authority and the Strategic Airlift Capability Partnership’s Multinational Airlift Fleet, 77 J. AIR L. &
COM. 105, 144 (2012) (stating that the Emoluments Clause was designed to address the
problem of “divided loyalty”).
40 See Seth Barrett Tillman, The Original Public Meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause:
A Reply to Professor Zephyr Teachout, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 180, 185 (2013) (explor-
ing the notion that “the core purpose of the Foreign Emoluments Clause was to ensure the
loyalty of those holding federal appointed or statutory offices”).
41 Cf. Andrew D. Miller, Note, Terminating the “Just Not American Enough” Idea: Saying
“Hasta La Vista” to the Natural-Born-Citizen Requirement of Presidential Eligibility, 57 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 97, 117 (2006) (describing the importance of undivided presidential loyalties in
another context).
42 But cf. D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 707 (2013)
(arguing that common-law fiduciary principles apply to politicians).  I do not take a posi-
tion here as to whether there exists (either literally or by profitable analogy) a general
common-law fiduciary duty owed by officers of the United States.
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presumes and enforces a duty of loyalty to the people of the United States as
against a foreign state.  However, while the Emoluments Clause itself is
directed at enforcing a fairly narrow and specific duty (i.e., loyalty to the
American people vis-a`-vis a foreign threat), it may also serve as evidence that
the Framers presumed and contemplated a broader fiduciary relationship
between the American people and their officers.43
There has recently been emerging scholarly interest in understanding
the ethical and legal obligations of political leaders through the lens of the
fiduciary relationship.44  Support for the proposition that fiduciary principles
are legally binding on federal officers has also been identified in the General
Welfare Clause,45 the Twenty-Seventh Amendment,46 and other constitu-
tional provisions.47
Several scholars have also argued that the record of debate at the Consti-
tutional Convention of 1787 and other contemporaneous writing of the time
indicate that the Framers presumed that federal officers would be bound by
enforceable fiduciary obligations.48  Professor Robert Natelson, for example,
has made a persuasive case that the Framers understood public officials to be
43 Id. at 711 (“[T]here is evidence that the Framers intended to incorporate fiduciary
principles into the constitutional structure.”).
44 See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Essay, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Cri-
tique, 125 YALE L.J. 1820, 1823 (2016) (“Our thesis is that fiduciary principles can be fruit-
fully applied to many domains of public law.”); Ethan J. Leib et al., Translating Fiduciary
Principles into Public Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 91, 91–92 (2013) (“What might be called
‘fiduciary political theory’ can indeed provide us with insight into institutional design
within liberal democracies . . . .  Because public office is a public trust, fiduciary architec-
ture can help orient us in figuring out how political power should be exercised legiti-
mately.”); David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib, Essay, Fiduciary Law’s Lessons for Deliberative
Democracy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1249, 1250 (2011) (“If our elected political leaders are, after all,
our public fiduciaries, they may be bound by fiduciary duties that underwrite a dialogic
imperative with their constituents.”).  For a contrary view, see Seth Davis, The False Promise
of Fiduciary Government, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 1156–71 (2014) (describing fiduciary
law as a poor fit as a mechanism of constraining the behavior of public officials).
45 Natelson, supra note 32, at 53 (“[T]he General Welfare Clause served the same end
of fiduciary-style impartiality.”).
46 Rave, supra note 42, at 714 (“The Twenty-Seventh Amendment attempted to solve
what would otherwise be a breach of the duty of loyalty by providing that no change in
compensation [of representatives] may take effect before an intervening election of
representatives . . . .”).
47 See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in
THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 52, 52–53 (Gary Lawson et al. eds.,
2010) (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause is a constitutional source of fiduciary
duty, and stating that “[t]he Constitution should be read through a fiduciary lens,” in
accordance with one of the document’s “central purpose[s]”—“to adopt for America a
federal government whose conduct would mimic that of the private-law fiduciary”).
48 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Guy I. Seidman & Robert G. Natelson, The Fiduciary Founda-
tions of Federal Equal Protection, 94 B.U. L. REV. 415, 428, 424–34 (2014) (arguing that the
Framers understood the Constitution to be “a grant of powers from a principal, identified
in the Preamble as ‘We the People of the United States,’ to various designees or agents”
(footnote omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.)).
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“legally bound to (appropriately adapted) standards borrowed from the law
regulating private fiduciaries.”49  Natelson makes the case that discussions
surrounding constitutional structure at the Constitutional Convention in
1787 were frequently based on fiduciary principles, and that the delegates
described government officials as “the people’s servants, agents, guardians,
or trustees.”50  Natelson has argued that “[t]his was a subject on which there
was no disagreement from the Constitution’s opponents.”51  The Federalist
Papers, too, are replete with references to a duty of loyalty and make frequent
use of the term “fiduciary” in that context,52 as are contemporary political
writings in the period following the ratification of the Constitution.53
Professor Theodore Rave has extended Natelson’s argument that the
Framers presumed and contemplated a broad and binding fiduciary relation-
ship between elected officials and the people.54  Rave provides two theoreti-
cal bases that justify the imposition of a binding fiduciary duty on elected
officials, arguing that both contract theory and the theory of delegated politi-
cal authority support the proposition that politicians are bound by fiduciary
principles.55
However, we need not here undertake the project of weighing the full
scope and implications of a federal officer’s binding fiduciary duty, because
the Emoluments Clause’s prohibition is both narrow and specific.56  It identi-
fies a narrow class of behavior to be avoided in furtherance of a specific kind
49 Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1088
(2004); see also Ponet & Leib, supra note 44, at 1249–50 (“[F]eatures of fiduciary law use-
fully model how deliberation can be understood between political unequals, in particular
when the individual with more political power is supposed to be holding the interests of
the individual with less power in trust.”).
50 Natelson, supra note 49, at 1084.
51 Id. at 1084–85.  But see Davis, supra note 44, at 1171 (“[W]hen the Founders raised
the theory of fiduciary government, they often did so in connection with political, not
judicial, mechanisms for holding government accountable.  As a result, there simply is not
compelling enough evidence that the Founders intended to incorporate trust law as consti-
tutional law to justify disturbing settled constitutional understandings.”).
52 For example, James Madison described the government as an agent of the people in
Federalist No. 46, where he wrote that “[t]he federal and State governments are in fact but
different agents and trustees of the people.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 329, 330 (James
Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
53 Rave, supra note 42, at 710 (“In the years following the Revolution, the newly inde-
pendent Americans frequently used the language of agency and trusteeship in reference to
their legislative representatives.”).
54 See id. at 720 (“Indeed, in The Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton explained that it
was the role of the judiciary to keep elected agents within the limits of their delegated
authority.”).
55 Id. at 711 (“Recognizing that political representatives bear a duty of loyalty is also
consistent with two major theoretical justifications for fiduciary duties in private law: con-
tract and delegated power.”).
56 Cf. EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY 22 (2011)
(grounding constitutional authority in the implicit fiduciary relationship that exists
between the state and the governed).
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of duty: a duty of loyalty to the people as against a foreign influence.57  The
core of this insight is simple: federal officers—including, as in the case at
hand, the President of the United States—owe a duty of loyalty to the people
they govern.58  If we apply this idea to the President of the United States, it
would follow that the President has an ethical and legal obligation not to put
his own interest before the interest of the people when the two interests are
in conflict.59
So if the Emoluments Clause is a mechanism to enforce an underlying
duty of loyalty to the people as against foreign influence, how might we char-
acterize the injury that follows from a violation of the Clause?  I turn to this
question next.
B. Fiduciary Injury
If the Emoluments Clause imposes a fiduciary duty, then the injury that
follows from a violation of the Clause—at least the primary injury, the injury
we should care about—is a purely fiduciary injury.  By “purely” fiduciary I
mean to describe an injury that stands apart from any economic or liberty
injury that might also be incidental to the disloyalty.  A purely fiduciary injury
is the unique injury that follows breach of the duty of loyalty.  Disloyalty in
this context may involve putting the agent’s own interest ahead of the inter-
est of the principal.  Because the duty requires that the agent put the princi-
pal’s interest ahead of his own, when the agent fails to do so, he or she is in
breach.  The breach itself, being unlawful, is remediable, and the injury that
it remediates is a purely fiduciary injury.  A consideration of the manner in
which a purely fiduciary injury is distinct from other forms of injury inciden-
tal to a breach, as well as the types of relief available for fiduciary injury,
follows.
1. Injunctive Relief for Purely Fiduciary Injury
When a breach of fiduciary duty occurs, several remedial possibilities
loom.  The most important of these—from the emoluments perspective—is
57 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“[N]o Person holding any Office . . . shall . . . accept of
any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or
foreign State.”).
58 There is some dispute about whether the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to the
President of the United States. See, e.g., Tillman, supra note 40, at 185 (arguing that the
Clause does not apply to the President).  However, Presidents and their legal counsel have
generally behaved as though Presidents are bound by the Clause.  For example, Presidents
Van Buren and Tyler sought consent from Congress to keep presents they received from
foreign governments.  President Jackson chose to submit a foreign gift to congressional
control. Id. at 190.
59 See D. Theodore Rave, Fiduciary Voters?, 66 DUKE L.J. 331, 342 (2016) (identifying
the core of fiduciary duty as “the duty of loyalty, which requires the fiduciary to act for the
exclusive benefit of the beneficiary—to put the beneficiary’s interests ahead of his own”).
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injunctive relief to stop the bad behavior.60  It is well settled that to redress a
purely fiduciary injury, “[t]he court, on motion of the attorney general or on
its own, can ‘enjoin[ ] wrongful conduct . . . [in] redress of a breach or per-
formance of fiduciary duties.’”61  The breach itself (being unlawful) can be
enjoined even in the absence of a demonstration of actual harm to the prin-
cipal.62  An example that is similar to the emoluments context at issue here
arises in the context of the employer-employee relationship.63  When an
employee is subject to a fiduciary duty of loyalty to an employer and breaches
that duty, the employee can be preliminarily enjoined on a prima facie show-
ing of wrongdoing.64  It has been observed that “[t]his liberal preliminary
injunction proof standard is especially necessary in fiduciary duty cases, for
the injured employer will rarely be able to offer direct proof of misconduct
by its agents; employees invariably disguise their disloyal activities.”65
This low threshold for obtaining relief supports the deterrence value of
the rule against disloyalty by punishing bad conduct per se.66  While compen-
sation is sometimes a functional component of the rule, it is not a necessary
function of the rule.67  As disloyalty in the context of a fiduciary duty is
malum in se (or, at least so thought the Framers) it follows that the primary
60 Punitive damages are a second important form of relief available in the context of a
purely fiduciary injury, a full discussion of which exceeds the scope of this piece. See, e.g.,
MISSISSIPPI LAW OF TORTS § 17:13 (2d ed.), Westlaw (databased updated Dec. 2018) (“A
breach of a fiduciary duty has been recognized by the [Mississippi] Supreme Court as an
‘extreme or a special additional circumstance’ in which punitive damages may be appropri-
ate.” (quoting Ross-King-Walker, Inc. v. Henson, 672 So. 2d 1188, 1192 (Miss. 1996))).
61 Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforce-
ment, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 954 n.64 (2004) (second alteration in original) (quoting EDITH L.
FISCH ET AL., CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS § 711, at 549–50 (1974)).
62 See Christopher L. Gadoury, Breach of Fiduciary Duty Remedies, 32 ADVOC. (State Bar
of Tex.), Fall 2005, at 54 (“A plaintiff can obtain injunctive relief [to] enjoin a fiduciary’s
continued breach of duty, such as an agent’s or former agent’s misappropriation of trade
secrets and competition with the principal.”); see also Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229,
238–40 (Tex. 1999) (holding a client need not prove harm to recover fees in a breach of
fiduciary duty action against an attorney).
63 See, e.g., William Lynch Schaller, Disloyalty and Distrust: The Eroding Fiduciary Duties of
Illinois Employees, 3 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 1, 9–11 (1990) (discussing the imposition of a fiduci-
ary duty of loyalty on employees under Illinois law).
64 Id. at 62.
65 Id.
66 See, e.g., George P. Roach, Texas Remedies in Equity for Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Dis-
gorgement, Forfeiture, and Fracturing, 45 ST. MARY’S L.J. 367, 391–92 (2014) (“Traditionally,
Texas courts have offered two explanations for the apparent severity of remedies for
breach of fiduciary duty. . . . Courts emphasize the need for deterrence and to minimize
the temptation for fiduciaries to abuse their powerful positions of control over their cli-
ents’ assets and opportunities.”).
67 See Sandra K. Miller, The Best of Both Worlds: Default Fiduciary Duties and Contractual
Freedom in Alternative Business Entities, 39 J. CORP. L. 295, 326 (2014) (“Fiduciary duties are
believed to serve a number of important policy interests, including, but not limited to, a
socialization function; a culturally based, expressive objective; a deterrence role; and a
remedial role.” (footnotes omitted)).
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function of the rule enforcing loyalty is to first stop the bad behavior and,
secondarily, to deter others from similar malfeasance.68  The employer-prin-
cipal need not show that he or she will or has already suffered an economic
injury as a result of the breach in order to ask a court to enjoin it.69
Similarly, in the context of an emoluments violation, when the officer-
agent who is bound by a duty of loyalty to the principal-citizens violates that
duty, the breach itself is remediable without a further showing of other harm.
The harm is in the breach itself.  This is so because as in the employer-
employee context, harm is obvious in the context of an officer conspiring
with a foreign state.  Thus, injunctive relief should be available upon a prima
facie showing of breach.  As in other contexts, the rule in the emoluments
context should be construed as prophylactic, and the injury that follows from
an officer’s disloyalty to the people at the behest of a foreign state exists
solely by virtue of the breach itself.70
Further, by prohibiting the specific conduct of accepting an emolument,
the Clause creates the terms of the breach.71  Assuming we understand the
officer-agent to owe a duty of loyalty to the principal-citizens that is, in part,
codified in the Emoluments Clause, violation of the Clause constitutes
breach of the duty.  A prima facie showing of violation is then a prima facie
showing of breach, and should be adequate to compel preliminary injunctive
relief.  Successful demonstration of the merits of a violation of the Clause is a
successful demonstration of the merits of breach, and should be adequate to
compel permanent injunctive relief.
2. Distinguishing Economic Injury from Fiduciary Injury
It is important to be clear that an economic injury is distinct from a
purely fiduciary injury.  While an economic injury may coincide with a fiduci-
ary injury, the two types of harms should not be conflated.  When an agent
breaches a duty of loyalty, relief may be available regardless of economic
loss.72  This is particularly true where the agent-principal relationship is a
relationship of particular trust or unequal power, as is sometimes the case
68 See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 995–96 (2d Cir.
1983) (“An action for breach of fiduciary duty is a prophylactic rule intended to remove all
incentive to breach—not simply to compensate for damages in the event of a breach.”
(citing Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969))).
69 See Schaller, supra note 63, at 62.
70 See ABKCO Music, Inc., 722 F.2d at 995–96.
71 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (using words such as “shall” and “of any kind” to indicate
prohibited conduct).
72 See, e.g., Sande Buhai, Lawyers as Fiduciaries, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 553, 580–81 (2009)
(“The Restatement (Third) of Agency . . . [states that] [a]n agent has an affirmative fiduci-
ary duty ‘to act loyally for the principal’s benefit. . . .’   . . .  And breaches of these duties are
broadly enforceable, regardless of whether the principal can show actual harm.” (second
omission in original) (quoting and citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01, § 8.01
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006))).
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with attorneys, doctors, or clergy.73  The attorney-client relationship, in par-
ticular, is one in which relief is often available in the absence of economic
loss, largely in service of the prophylactic deterrent value of the rule proscrib-
ing breach.74
Because a fiduciary injury can coincide with an economic injury in many
circumstances, there is occasionally some confusion surrounding the concept
of fiduciary injury.  This is especially so where injunctive relief is not
requested and only compensatory damages (or punitive and compensatory
damages) are sought.  However, a helpful way to isolate fiduciary injury is to
interrogate whether a court could enjoin a breach of fiduciary duty in the
absence of economic loss.
Consider, for example, ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., a
case involving George Harrison, of the Beatles fame.75  In 1971, Harrison was
involved in a copyright dispute with Bright Tunes Music Corp. over the song
“My Sweet Lord.”76  In the midst of the copyright dispute, Harrison’s busi-
ness manager, Allen Klein, engaged in negotiations with Bright Tunes to
purchase Bright Tunes for Klein’s own use.77  Harrison was unaware of these
negotiations.78  To advance his cause to purchase the company, Klein pro-
vided Bright Tunes with inside information about the value of the song in
dispute, thereby harming Harrison’s effort to reach a settlement with Bright
Tunes.79  In that circumstance, Harrison suffered first a purely fiduciary
injury.80  Had Harrison discovered that Klein was negotiating on his own
behalf before Klein’s action had actually affected Harrison’s ongoing negoti-
ation with Bright Tunes, Harrison could have enjoined Klein from continued
or future breach of his fiduciary duty, even if Klein’s breach had not yet
caused Harrison any economic injury.81  However, since the breach was not
73 Caroline Forell & Anna Sortun, The Tort of Betrayal of Trust, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
557, 567 (2009) (“During the past thirty years, numerous breach of fiduciary duty claims
have been brought where the injury is essentially non-financial; on review, appellate courts
have occasionally allowed them to go forward.  In these cases, the impermissible conflict of
interest may be financial, personal, or both.  The parties most frequently sued in these
contexts are doctors, lawyers, clergy, and other professionals whose main role is not man-
aging money or running a business.  Instead, their central role is to provide services to
people who are faced with personal problems that require both undivided loyalty and the
maintenance of confidentiality.” (footnote omitted)).
74 See Buhai, supra note 72, at 587.
75 ABKCO Music, Inc., 722 F.2d at 990.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 991.
78 Id. at 991 (“[A]pparently unknown to George Harrison, Klein had been negotiating
with Bright Tunes to purchase all of Bright Tunes’ stock.”).
79 Id. at 995.
80 Id. at 995 (“[A]lthough not wholly analogous to the side-switching cases involving
attorneys and their former clients, this fact situation creates clear questions of
impropriety.”).
81 2 JOEL W. MOHRMAN & ROBERT J. CALDWELL, HANDLING BUSINESS TORT CASES § 28:8,
Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015) (“[T]he court can enjoin the fiduciary from contin-
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discovered until after the economic damage was done, Harrison was able to
recover compensatory damages for his economic loss.82
3. Primary Emoluments Injury as Fiduciary Injury
In the emoluments context, it could be the case that a citizen-principal
suffers an economic loss caused by an officer’s breach of the duty of loyalty
imposed by the Emoluments Clause.83  However, an economic loss associated
with an Emoluments Clause violation will always be tangential or collateral to
the primary injury.  The primary injury that attends an emoluments violation
is a purely fiduciary injury.  The Clause is a guarantee that a federal officer
will not breach his or her duty of loyalty to the people on behalf of a foreign
state.84  Thus, the injury caused by a violation of the Clause is tied to the
fiduciary nature of that promise.  Like the injury that arises from the breach
of an attorney-client fiduciary relationship, an Emoluments Clause injury is
an injury of disloyalty, regardless of whether that disloyalty results in eco-
nomic or other loss.85  Disloyalty will always be the primary injury that results
from its violation.86
One way that we can identify the fiduciary injury inherent in a violation
of the Clause is by imagining that an emoluments violation was currently
happening and that the unlawful behavior was ongoing.  In that circum-
stance it is uncontroversial that an individual with standing to sue could ask a
court to enjoin the ongoing violation.87  In that situation—assuming a plain-
tiff with standing—injunctive relief would almost surely be available.  The
court has the power to stop the unlawful behavior even in the absence of
demonstrable economic loss.88
uing to breach his duties, or otherwise order him to do things that will protect the
beneficiary.”).
82 ABKCO Music, Inc., 722 F.2d at 996–97.
83 The CREW complaint, for example, asserts that plaintiffs who owned or were
employed by hotels competing with President Trump’s hotel would suffer an economic
loss of lost business or commission-based income.  CREW Second Amended Complaint,
supra note 3, at 7–8.
84 EISEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 7 (“Ultimately, the theory of the Emoluments Clause—
grounded in English history and the Framers’ experience—is that a federal officeholder
who receives something of value from a foreign power can be imperceptibly induced to
compromise what the Constitution insists be his exclusive loyalty: the best interest of the
United States of America.”).
85 See Applicability of Emoluments Clause to Employment of Government Employees
by Foreign Public Universities, 18 Op. O.L.C. 13, 18 (1994) (“Those who hold offices
under the United States must give the government their unclouded judgment and their
uncompromised loyalty.”).
86 See Rave, supra note 42, at 707 (“[I]t is appropriate to think of political representa-
tives as standing in a fiduciary capacity to the people they represent, giving rise to a fiduci-
ary duty of loyalty.”).
87 See 2 MOHRMAN & CALDWELL, supra note 81, § 28:8.
88 See Forell & Sortun, supra note 73, at 567.
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However, the key to judicial intervention in the preceding hypothetical
is the existence of a plaintiff with standing.  The Supreme Court’s current
standing doctrine presents a potential obstacle to the redress of the type of
fiduciary injury at issue in the emoluments context.  This fact, coupled with
the Court’s preference for collective rather individual action to redress a cer-
tain class of constitutional wrong, creates a complicated picture for any emol-
uments-based lawsuit.  A fuller discussion of these points follows.
II. STANDING AND FIDUCIARY INJURY
In agency law, when an agent violates his duty of loyalty, an individual
principal can directly sue to enforce the duty or seek compensation.89  In the
context of a corporation, the agent may be a CEO and the principals may be
shareholders.90  In that context, a shareholder need not depend upon the
board of directors to intervene to curb or redress the principal’s disloyal
behavior.91  There are several reasons why the availability of a direct, rather
than representative, mechanism of enforcement is important.92  The most
compelling reason is that the interests of the board and the interests of the
principals may not perfectly align.93  The board may have an interest in
maintaining the unlawful behavior or it may have an interest in shielding the
CEO from scandal or criticism.94  This is a classic agency problem.95
Agency law accounts for these potentially misaligned interests by provid-
ing the shareholder with a direct cause of action.96  The reason for this is
simple: the breach of a duty of loyalty is so serious a threat to the well-being
of the corporation that the most robust set of tools possible must be made
89 Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 879, 920 (“[C]ases permit individual shareholders to sue directly when the directors
misuse their powers,” resulting in a breach of fiduciary duty.).
90 Id. (“The corporation’s directors surely owe a fiduciary obligation to the corpora-
tion, and, in the United States, are often assumed to owe such an obligation directly to the
corporation’s shareholders as well.”).
91 Id. (“That an individual action is permitted, and the claim is not treated as one that
must be asserted derivatively on the corporation’s behalf, is consistent with treating the
director’s duty as one owed directly to the shareholders . . . .”).
92 See Minor Myers, Fixing Multi-Forum Shareholder Litigation, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 467,
474–75 (“The great bulk of corporate law is directed at minimizing the costs associated
with [the] agency problem [of managers not acting in the interests of their shareholders].
State law fiduciary duties are the principal substantive corporate law rules that limit direc-
tor and manager opportunism, and shareholder suits—either derivative actions or direct
claims—are the mechanism for enforcing those duties.  The threat of a fiduciary suit can
deter management misconduct, and this deterrence rationale is regarded as the chief justi-
fication for shareholder suits.” (footnotes omitted)).
93 Id. at 474 (“[T]here is the ever-present risk that managers may fail to act in the
interests of shareholders.”).
94 See id. at 474–75.
95 Helen Garten, Institutional Investors and the New Financial Order, 44 RUTGERS L. REV.
585, 588 (1992) (“Since the preferences of managers and shareholders diverge, a classic
agency problem develops.”).
96 DeMott, supra note 89, at 920.
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available to arrest the malfeasance.97  In this light, the broad grant of stand-
ing is less about making shareholders whole than it is about protecting the
well-being of the corporation.98  It is a prophylactic rule designed to discour-
age the unlawful behavior and to arrest it when it does arise.99
A similar set of principles is applicable in the context of an emoluments
violation.  In that context, the principal is “the People” and the agent is the
federal officer alleged to be in violation of the Clause.  We might think of
Congress as the board of directors in this analogy.  Congress is empowered to
sanction an officer who is in violation of the Clause, but Congress’s interests
may not align perfectly with the interests of the people with respect to pro-
tecting the United States from the consequences of foreign influence.  The
self-interest of Congress as a whole—or a significant segment of individual
members—may counsel against sanctioning a federal officer who has violated
the Emoluments Clause.  Members of Congress may have partisan or per-
sonal reasons for declining to act against an officer in violation of the Clause.
The solution to avoiding this classic agency problem in the context of an
emoluments violation is to allow citizens to sue directly to enforce the Clause.
As in other agency situations, the threat of harm to the well-being of the
nation is sufficiently severe as to warrant the empowerment of individual citi-
zen suits.
This is particularly so when the federal officer involved is the President
of the United States—a position that, if compromised by foreign influence,
could impose unique and unprecedented damage on the country as a
whole.100  Because a breach of the duty of loyalty to the people in service to a
foreign power poses so serious a threat to the well-being of the nation, the
full panoply of enforcement mechanisms should be available to arrest the
malfeasance, including both an impeachment proceeding by Congress and
individual citizen suits.  An Emoluments Clause violation presents a quintes-
sential checks-and-balances scenario, in which each of the other branches of
government should be empowered to place a check on an allegedly disloyal
executive branch.
However, in similar circumstances, the Supreme Court has demon-
strated a preference for broad constitutional remedies that are mediated pri-
marily through the elected representatives of the political branches.101  The
97 See Myers, supra note 92, at 474–75.
98 See id.
99 Id. at 475 (“The threat of a fiduciary suit can deter management misconduct, and
this deterrence rationale is regarded as the chief justification for shareholder suits.” (foot-
note omitted)).
100 See Miller, supra note 41, at 117 (“Ensuring that the President of the United States
does not suffer from divided loyalties, and that the corresponding foreign influence is not
introduced into American government [is a compelling interest] . . . , given that the office
of President of the United States has become the most powerful such position in the world
and that the President holds the power of commander-in-chief of the American
military . . . .”).
101 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 700 (2013) (“[The prohibition against gen-
eralized grievances] is an essential limit on our power: It ensures that we act as judges, and
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Court has repeatedly indicated that it is disinclined to be conscripted by indi-
vidual citizen suits into checking the political branches when they overstep
constitutional boundaries in a manner that affects all Americans in the same
way.102  The Court has communicated this preference through its “genera-
lized-grievance” doctrine.103  A consideration of that doctrine and its implica-
tions in the Emoluments Clause context follows.
A. The Pragmatism of Injury in Fact
The Supreme Court’s standing doctrine is an obstacle to direct, individ-
ual enforcement of the duty of loyalty in the emoluments context.104  The
Supreme Court locates the constitutional authority for its standing doctrine
in Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.105  The Court has explained
that Article III standing doctrine is necessary to protect the constitutional
value of separation of powers.106  In particular the Court has expressed a
strong disinclination to have the judicial branch conscripted by individual
citizens into policing the executive branch or legislative branch where the
wrong complained of is an undifferentiated wrong—that is, a wrong that bur-
dens all of the people to the same degree or in the same way.107
do not engage in policymaking properly left to elected representatives.”); Arpaio v.
Obama, 27 F. Supp. 3d 185, 191 (D.D.C. 2014) (“The role of the Judiciary is to resolve
cases and controversies properly brought by parties with a concrete and particularized
injury—not to engage in policymaking better left to the political branches.”).
102 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992) (describing a generalized-
grievance suit as one that claims only harm to “every citizen’s interest in proper application
of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits
him than it does the public at large”).
103 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968) (stating standing should be denied in
“cases such as Frothingham where a taxpayer seeks to employ a federal court as a forum in
which to air his generalized grievances about the conduct of government or the allocation
of power in the Federal System”).
104 Cf. Jonathan H. Adler, Why CREW’s Emoluments Clause Lawsuit Against President
Trump Still Has Standing Problems, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/04/19/why-crews-emoluments-clause-lawsuit-
against-president-trump-still-has-standing-problems/?utm_term=.9a5ac3c814c2 (discussing
additional justiciability obstacles for CREW’s suit posed by the other two standing require-
ments: causation and redressability).
105 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  In explaining its standing doctrine, the Court has
identified three broad components of Article III standing—injury in fact, causation, and
redressability. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.  Of these, only injury in fact is of concern
here.
106 See Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret,
107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 171 (2012) (“Although it is hardly obvious from analysis of the
constitutional text, the Supreme Court has long held that Article III compels most of the
requirements of the standing doctrine.”).
107 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–75.
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In service of this idea, the Court has articulated a prohibition against
“generalized grievances.”108  One might understand the prohibition against
generalized grievances as a requirement that plaintiff must be hurt in a way
that is distinct from the way that all Americans are hurt by certain govern-
mental failings.109  The Court has explained that generalized injuries are
best addressed through the political process.110
Standing doctrine as it is currently comprised is a distinctly modern
development.111  In the early 1920s, the Court adopted the position that the
words “Cases” and “Controversies” used in Article III, Section 2, Clause 1
impose an affirmative separation-of-powers limit on the power of the federal
courts to hear cases where the plaintiff’s grievance was based on his or her
status as a taxpayer.112  The Court explained that where plaintiff’s harm
arises from his or her status as a taxpayer, his or her interest “is shared with
108 The generalized-grievance prohibition is a subset of the Court’s broader injury-in-
fact requirement.  The injury-in-fact rule requires that a plaintiff demonstrate “an invasion
of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or
imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.”’” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (footnote and
citations omitted) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).  The Court
has confirmed that the injury-in-fact requirement is independently constitutionally man-
dated as a fundamental aspect of separation-of-power principles.  Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014).
109 See Lee & Ellis, supra note 106, at 184 (“In the end, Fairchild’s complaint was a
generalized grievance—a request by no one in particular to have courts police the govern-
ment to see that it follows the law.”).
110 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (“Slow, cumbersome,
and unresponsive though the traditional electoral process may be thought at times, our
system provides for changing members of the political branches when dissatisfied citizens
convince a sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected representatives are delin-
quent in performing duties committed to them.”).
111 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1064
(2015) (“Through most of American legal history, standing doctrine as we know it today—
as a doctrine regulating who is a proper party to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court
to assert a legal claim or defense, either at trial or on appeal—did not exist.”); Steven L.
Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371,
1374 (1988) (“Rather, a painstaking search of the historical material demonstrates that—
for the first 150 years of the Republic—the Framers, the first Congresses, and the Court
were oblivious to the modern conception either that standing is a component of the consti-
tutional phrase ‘cases or controversies’ or that it is a prerequisite for seeking governmental
compliance with the law.”). But see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (“[T]he core component of
standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of
Article III.”).
112 The objection to taxpayer suits was arguably introduced in Fairchild v. Hughes, 258
U.S. 126 (1922).  The plaintiffs in Fairchild objected to the Nineteenth Amendment and
asked, as taxpayers, that the Court declare it void and unconstitutional. Id. at 127.  Rather
than responding to the merits of the case, the Court declared: “Plaintiff’s alleged interest
in the question submitted is not such as to afford a basis for this proceeding.  It is frankly a
proceeding to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared void.”  Id. at 129.  The limiting
principle of what constitutes an Article III case was then again articulated more famously
the following year in another taxpayer suit, Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486–89
(1923).
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millions of others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the
effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the funds, [is] so remote,
fluctuating and uncertain.”113  Such was the initial evolution of the “Cases”
and “Controversies” language into the requirement that a plaintiff have what
the Court would eventually described as an “injury in fact.”114  While these
early cases might be described as protostanding cases, they only hint at the
formulaic rendering the Court would ultimately embrace.115
While the Court continues to derive the constitutional dimension from
the “Cases” and “Controversies” language just as it did in the 1920s taxpayer
suits, the original textual support for the doctrine has largely been subsumed
by focus on the rationale that Article III standing doctrine is necessitated by
separation-of-powers principles.116
The impetus for the separation-of-powers rationale is fairly traceable to
the Court’s articulated anxiety about the federal courts being “flooded” with
constitutional complaints from individual citizens, an anxiety that was fueled
by a 1960s- and 1970s-era movement by private citizens seeking to directly
enforce their constitutional rights.117  Thus, direct citizen enforcement of
constitutional provisions can be understood to be a constitutive force in mod-
ern standing doctrine, and as such, it occupies a unique place within broader
standing doctrine.118
One case, in particular, had an outsized hand in ushering in the modern
standing era, although standing was not an issue in the case itself.119  In
1961, the Supreme Court decided Monroe v. Pape, in which thirteen Chicago
police officers, acting without a warrant, broke into the plaintiff’s home,
roused him and his wife from sleep, and made them stand naked in the living
room in front of their six children while the police officers ransacked their
home.120  Mr. Monroe was then taken downtown and held for ten hours on
113 Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487.
114 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (describing the case-or-controversy requirement).
115 See Lee & Ellis, supra note 106, at 170–71, 186–87.
116 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (“[T]he law of Art. III standing is built on
a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”); see also F. Andrew Hessick, The
Separation-of-Powers Theory of Standing, 95 N.C. L. REV. 673, 674 (2017) (“According to the
Court, the ‘single basic idea’ underlying Article III standing is ‘separation of powers.’”
(quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997))).
117 The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 97 HARV. L. REV.
208, 215 (1983) (“In the mid-1970’s, the Supreme Court began using standing doctrine
and a heightened standard for obtaining injunctive relief to limit the access of civil rights
litigants to the federal courts.”).
118 See Christina Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 6 (1980) (“During
recent years federal judges have elaborated various doctrines that, in purpose or effect,
discourage section 1983 litigants and dispose of specific cases,” standing doctrine among
them.).
119 See Laura Oren, Signing into Heaven: Zinermon v. Burch, Federal Rights, and State
Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe v. Pape, 40 EMORY L.J. 1, 10 (1991) (“Thirty years after
Monroe resuscitated the Reconstruction-era civil rights statute, there are cries that the fed-
eral courts are flooded with insignificant section 1983 lawsuits . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
120 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 169 (1961).  The complaint also alleged that
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“‘open’ charges” before he was released.121  Monroe challenged the constitu-
tionality of the officers’ actions, bringing his claim under what was then a
rarely used piece of Reconstruction legislation known as 42 U.S.C. § 1983.122
Although enacted as a Reconstruction-era statute in 1871, § 1983 was rarely
invoked before 1961, because prior to Monroe it was understood that § 1983
applied only to actions that were authorized by state law or custom.123
Monroe reversed that understanding and simultaneously introduced a
sea change in constitutional litigation.124  The Monroe Court held that § 1983
applied to unauthorized or rogue acts125 by those acting “under color of”
state law—like the thirteen police officers who harassed Mr. Monroe—and
the Monroe Court held that § 1983 provided a private cause of action for indi-
vidual citizens to sue to enforce their constitutional rights outside the context
of unconstitutional laws and policies.126  This opened the door to a whole
new class of constitutional litigation focused on abuse of power
allegations.127
Insofar as the Court was worried about being conscripted by individual
citizen suits into policing the political branches, Monroe was the case that set
that worry aflame.128  Both commentators and members of the Court
the officers roused the six Monroe children and herded them into the living
room; that Detective Pape struck Mr. Monroe several times with his flashlight,
calling him “[the n-word]” and “black boy”; that another officer pushed Mrs.
Monroe; [and] that other officers hit and kicked several of the children and
pushed them to the floor.
Id. at 203 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
121 Id. at 169.
122 Charles F. Abernathy, Section 1983 and Constitutional Torts, 77 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1446
(1989) (noting that § 1983 was rarely successfully used to challenge unlawful behavior
prior to Monroe).
123 See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 239–40, 240 n.68 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
124 To demonstrate the impact of Monroe, it is worth noting that in 1961, there were
fewer than 300 suits brought in federal court under all civil rights acts; in 1971, there were
8267; and in 2010, there were 60,000. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS:
ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION 14 (3d ed. 2013).
125 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 176, 187.
126 Id. at 180 (“[O]ne reason [§ 1983] was passed was to afford a federal right in fed-
eral courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state
laws might not be enforced . . . by the state agencies.”).
127 William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 227 (1988)
(“[G]enerally speaking, federal litigation in the 1960’s and 1970’s increasingly involved
attempts to establish and enforce public, often constitutional, values by litigants who were
not individually affected by the conduct of which they complained in any way markedly
different from most of the population.”).  This sequence of events sheds light on why a
more formulaic standing standard consequently developed. See id. at 230.
128 Perry M. Rosen, The Bivens Constitutional Tort: An Unfulfilled Promise, 67 N.C. L. REV.
337, 338, 340 (1989) (“The emergence of the constitutional tort forced the Court to strike
a balance between protecting the rights of individuals to seek redress for violations of their
constitutional rights and ensuring that the proper functioning of government is not hin-
dered by a plethora of insubstantial lawsuits.”); see also Jose´ Roberto Jua´rez, Jr., The Supreme
Court as the Cheshire Cat: Escaping the Section 1983 Wonderland, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 51–52
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expressed worry about Monroe’s impact on federal dockets almost from the
moment that it was decided.129  Concern was voiced that Monroe would open
the “floodgates” of constitutional litigation and overwhelm the federal
courts.130  There was concern that the judiciary would be drawn into the
uncomfortable position of supervising coequal branches of government.131
These separation-of-powers, docket-crowding, and institutional-compe-
tency concerns were often marshaled by the Court into standing principles,
which began to serve as the anteroom of constitutional litigation.132  One
particularly standing-adjacent concern was raised by Justice Frankfurter in his
Monroe dissent in which he worried that “[i]f [§ 1983] is made a vehicle of
constitutional litigation in cases where state officers have acted lawlessly . . . ,
difficult questions of the federal constitutionality of certain official practices
. . . may be litigated between private parties without the participation of
responsible state authorities.”133
The Court responded to this concern by developing the requirement
that a plaintiff have a “concrete and particularized” (CAP) injury in fact.134
A CAP injury is an injury that, by definition, is differentiated because it is
“particularized” to the plaintiff in an individual way.135  The CAP rule is
designed to limit the number of potential plaintiffs who have standing in a
given constitutional controversy.136  In preventing plaintiffs without “particu-
larized” injuries from accessing the courts, the CAP requirement is thought
(1993) (“The flood-of-cases argument suggests that the federal courts are burdened with a
deluge of Section 1983 cases because decisions like Monroe v. Pape have gone too far . . . .”
(footnotes omitted)).
129 See Oren, supra note 119, at 26 n.162; see also Kevin J. Hamilton, Section 1983 and the
Independent Contractor, 74 GEO. L.J. 457, 464 (1985) (“Monroe breathed new life into section
1983.  Its broad interpretation, combined with the ‘incorporation’ of the Bill of Rights into
the fourteenth amendment, led to a flood of litigation.” (footnote omitted)).
130 Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007, 1008 (2013)
(“Over the past several decades, the Supreme Court has increasingly considered a particu-
lar kind of argument: that it should avoid reaching decisions that would ‘open the flood-
gates of litigation.’” (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 166–67 (1908))).
131 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (“We
should be ever mindful of the contradictions that would arise if a democracy were to per-
mit general oversight of the elected branches of government by a nonrepresentative, and
in large measure insulated, judicial branch.”).
132 See Whitman, supra note 118, at 6–7.
133 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 241 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
134 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[O]ur cases have established
that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements.  First,
the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected inter-
est which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . .”).
135 See id. at 560 n.1.
136 The idea that “generalized grievances” must be barred to reduce the sheer number
of possible suits was first articulated in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923) (“If
one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then every other taxpayer may do
the same, not only in respect of the statute here under review but also in respect of every
other appropriation act and statute whose administration requires the outlay of public
money . . . .  The bare suggestion of such a result, with its attendant inconveniences, goes
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to serve two pragmatic ends: (1) to limit the number of opportunities that
federal courts have to pass upon the constitutionality of actions taken by the
executive or legislative branches (and thereby safeguard separation-of-power
values); and (2) to ensure that the people with the greatest stake in a contro-
versy are the sole people authorized litigate it.137
Much criticism138 has been leveled at the Supreme Court’s translation of
the case-or-controversy language in Article III into the CAP injury-in-fact
requirement.139  For example, criticism has been directed at its late appear-
ance in constitutional doctrine.140  Critics have likewise questioned the pur-
ported textual and historical foundation for the rule,141 and ample criticism
has been directed at what many perceive to be the Court’s uneven applica-
tion of the rule.142  We need not re-plow those furrows here.  For our pur-
poses it is enough to consider plausible explanations and justifications
offered in support of the CAP rule to evaluate whether those explanations
and justifications obtain in the context of the Emoluments Clause.
1. A Pragmatic Explanation of CAP
Richard Posner has offered one of the more plausible explanations of
the CAP injury-in-fact rule: judicial pragmatism.143  Posner states:
The doctrine is needed [1] to limit premature judicial interference with leg-
islation, [2] to prevent the federal courts from being overwhelmed by cases,
and [3] to ensure that the legal remedies of primary victims of wrongful
conduct will not be usurped by persons trivially or not at all harmed by the
wrong complained of.144
far to sustain the conclusion which we have reached, that a suit of this character cannot be
maintained.”).
137 See, e.g., Am. Bottom Conservancy v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 650 F.3d 652,
655–57 (7th Cir. 2011) (emphasizing that plaintiffs with the most direct interest in a mat-
ter should be authorized to litigate it, rather than those with a remote connection to the
injury at hand).
138 See Kontorovich, supra note 13, at 1664–65.
139 See Elliott, supra note 13, at 466–67.
140 Winter, supra note 111, at 1377 (“One legitimately may wonder how a constitutional
doctrine now said to inhere in article III’s ‘case or controversy’ language could be so late in
making an appearance, do so with so skimpy a pedigree, and take so long to be recognized
even by the primary academic expositors of the law of federal courts.”).
141 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95–96 (1968) (describing with skepticism the “uncertain
historical antecedents of the case-and-controversy doctrine”); Am. Bottom Conservancy, 650
F.3d at 655 (noting criticism of the claim that standing practice is derived from “the
English royal courts, on which the federal judiciary was modeled”).
142 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 116 (7th ed. 2015) (“During the twentieth century, courts became self-
conscious about the concept of standing only after developments in the legal culture sub-
jected the traditional model to unfamiliar strains.”).
143 Am. Bottom Conservancy, 650 F.3d at 656 (“This isn’t to say that the doctrine of stand-
ing isn’t well grounded.  But the solidest grounds are practical . . . .”).
144 Id.
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The first of these justifications does not obtain in the context of constitu-
tional claims, but the second and third justifications are consistent both with
scholarly consensus and the Supreme Court’s own justificatory explanations
of CAP.
Within this rendering, Posner suggests a dichotomy between “primary
victims” and “persons trivially or not at all harmed.”145  To illustrate this
point, he poses a hypothetical based on the facts of the case pending before
him:
Imagine an environmental group located in California suing to prevent the
Corps of Engineers from granting a permit to destroy wetlands at the North
Milam site even though no member of the group planned ever to visit the
American Bottom.  The suit might be brought before American Bottom
Conservancy brought its own suit and the Conservancy’s suit might be over-
shadowed by the suit by the California group, even though the Conser-
vancy’s members have a greater stake because they actually frequent the
Horseshoe Lake State Park . . . .146
  Posner emphasizes that it is the directness of the injury that is important in
this analysis rather than the magnitude of the loss.147  Posner points out that
even Lujan, which offered the most complete articulation of the modern rule
of injury in fact, recognized that “the desire to use or observe an animal
species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest
for purpose of standing.”148  Within this hypothetical, the California group’s
injury is cognizable and sufficiently “concrete.”149  The Court has been clear
that intangible injuries (including “desires”) are sufficiently concrete to con-
fer standing.150  Instead, the problem with the hypothetical California
group’s injury is that it is not as direct as an ideal plaintiff’s injury might
be.151  Even though the California group has a cognizable desire to preserve
the wetlands, Judge Posner can imagine a “better” plaintiff—the American
Bottom Conservatory—whose members, ideally, would live near the park and
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. (“The magnitude, as distinct from the directness, of the injury is not critical to
the concerns that underlie the requirement of standing . . . .”).
148 Id. at 656–57 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–63 (1992)).
149 Although the Court has taken pains to articulate that the “concrete” is not merely a
synonym for “particularized” in injury-in-fact analysis, the distinction the Court has drawn
is exceedingly subtle, and for the purpose of our analysis it is sufficient to focus solely on
the “particularized” aspect of the CAP rule. See Felix T. Wu, How Privacy Distorted Standing
Law, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 439, 454 (2017) (“[T]he Court seemed also to invoke something
like a canon against surplusage, suggesting that the words ‘concrete’ and ‘particularized’ in
the test for Article III standing surely could not mean the same thing.”).
150 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548–49 (2016) (“A ‘concrete’ injury
must be ‘de facto’; that is, it must actually exist.  When we have used the adjective ‘con-
crete,’ we have meant to convey the usual meaning of the term—‘real,’ and not
‘abstract.’ . . . ‘Concrete’ is not, however, necessarily synonymous with ‘tangible.’  Although
tangible injuries are perhaps easier to recognize, we have confirmed in many of our previ-
ous cases that intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.” (citations omitted)).
151 Am. Bottom Conservancy, 650 F.3d at 656.
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visit it often.152  But the “directness” requirement need not be fatal to the
California group’s challenge in this action.  Presumably, to cure this constitu-
tional deficiency, the hypothetical California group need only find hypotheti-
cal local plaintiffs who are willing to join the complaint.
In this light, one wonders how much work the CAP rule is actually doing
to reduce the overall number of cases.  If the California group can cure its
standing problem by finding like-minded environmentalists who happen to
live closer to the park, the case will still be brought and standing will be
found.153  Yet, Posner’s pragmatic explanation for the CAP rule is in keeping
with the general scholarly consensus154 that the generalized-grievance prohi-
bition is largely, if not exclusively, a pragmatic solution to the Court’s worry
about being inundated with cases—a worry, as we have seen, that is particu-
larly acute in the context of post-Monroe constitutional litigation in which
individual citizens are empowered to directly enforce rights secured by the
Constitution.155
But Posner understands the CAP rule as both a qualitative and quantita-
tive control of potential plaintiffs.  The CAP rule, as applied in constitutional
cases, is not about the underlying conduct (and whether it was constitu-
tional); it is instead about who is empowered to bring a constitutional chal-
lenge.  The argument that the CAP rule has the capacity to provide a
quantitative control is fairly straightforward: by excluding plaintiffs who have
a generalized (rather than particularized) grievance, fewer cases can be
brought.156  As noted above, there is reason to be skeptical as to whether
CAP succeeds in limiting the number constitutional cases brought in federal
court.157  More significantly, however, the quantitative-control aspect of the
rule cannot stand alone.  One cannot justify arbitrarily excluding a class of
potential plaintiffs from access to the courts, even on the grounds of conserv-
ing judicial resources or safeguarding separation of powers.  While reducing
the overall number of cases might be a justifiable aim, for the rule itself to be
152 Id.
153 See id.
154 See, e.g., Winter, supra note 111, at 1487 n.648 (“It may well be the case that the
Court’s willingness to stretch standing doctrine . . . was the result of two intensely prag-
matic concerns.”); The Supreme Court, 1981 Term—Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure: Citizen
and Taxpayer Standing, 96 HARV. L. REV. 196, 205 (1982) (“The radical reformulation of
ordinary standing doctrine in the years following Flast promised a new, more pragmatic
theory of standing that could have superseded the artificial and technical doctrine of tax-
payer standing.”).
155 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 93 (1968) (describing the worry first expressed by the
Court in Frothingham v. Mellon that taxpayer suits “might open the door of federal courts to
countless such suits”).
156 See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923) (explaining that genera-
lized grievances must be barred to avoid an influx of cases).
157 Whether the CAP rule succeeds in limiting the number of constitutional claims that
are adjudicated on the merits is, of course, an empirical question.  Addressing that ques-
tion would require evaluating a counterfactual situation in which Monroe v. Pape allowed
individual constitutional enforcement in the absence of a requirement that plaintiff’s
injury be particularized.
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justified the rule must reduce the number of cases in a principled manner.
In other words, for the rule to be justified it must exclude and include plain-
tiffs along a qualitative metric.
The CAP rule, in Posner’s view, provides qualitative control over the
class of potential plaintiffs in constitutional cases by preferring the best liti-
gants (“directly” injured) over less desirable litigants (those who are “trivially”
or “indirectly” injured).158  The idea that those directly affected by an injuri-
ous event are the preferred litigants in a given scenario is intuitively appeal-
ing.159  However, while Posner’s pragmatic justification of the generalized-
grievance prohibition may have merit in other contexts, in the context of an
emoluments violation—and indeed, in the context of many (if not most)
constitutional violations—categorical adherence to the “direct” versus “triv-
ial” dichotomy is a legal fiction at best.  At worst, it produces absurd results.
A consideration of these best and worst possibilities follows.
2. The Pragmatic Explanation as Legal Fiction
Even within the most generous rendering, a justification of the CAP rule
that depends upon a meaningful distinction between “direct” and “trivial”
constitutional injuries is a legal fiction.  As a starting point, the terms “direct”
and “trivial” are themselves misleading.  Without doubt, citizens often suffer
very grave yet “indirect” constitutional injuries.
Consider, for example, the classic standing case of Allen v. Wright.160
The plaintiffs in Allen objected to the IRS’s granting of tax-exempt status to
private schools that the plaintiffs believed were racially discriminating.161
The injuries that the plaintiffs identified were undeniably serious.162  The
plaintiffs argued that by granting tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory
schools, the IRS was fostering racial segregation in public schools by provid-
ing a segregated private alternative for white families seeking a segregated
school.163  As parents of black school-aged children, the plaintiffs argued
that their children suffered the stigmatic and dignitary injuries incident to
the federally funded “white flight” that precipitated the persistence of racially
segregated schools.164  While the Allen Court found the constitutional injury
articulated by plaintiffs to be insufficiently direct to confer standing, it can
158 See Am. Bottom Conservancy v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 650 F.3d 652, 656 (7th
Cir. 2011).
159 See id. (“This isn’t to say that the doctrine of standing isn’t well grounded. . . . [T]he
solidest grounds are practical[,] . . .  [c]onsistent with the practical as well as doctrinal
thinking . . . .”).
160 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
161 Id. at 739.
162 Id. at 739–40 (“[Plaintiffs] assert that the IRS . . . interferes with the ability of their
children to receive an education in desegregated public schools.”).
163 Id. at 771 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
164 Id. at 754 (majority opinion).
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hardly be described as trivial.165  Obviously the stigmatic and dignitary injury
that attends the persistence of racially segregated schools is a very grave con-
stitutional injury.166 Allen teaches us that an indirect injury can still be a
substantial and serious injury.167
Similarly, some “direct” constitutional injuries are, in fact, trivial.  For
example, in Parratt v. Taylor,168 an inmate sued a prison for misplacing a
hobby kit that the inmate ordered through the mail.  The value of the hobby
kit was $23.50.169  The Court found that Taylor had standing to sue and had
a cognizable interest in recovering the value of the kit under the Due Process
Clause.170  Taylor’s injury, the Court found, was direct, concrete, and particu-
larized.171  In contrast, the Allen plaintiffs’ injuries were indirect and genera-
lized.172  Yet, if we assume the Allen plaintiffs stated their injuries
accurately,173 the Allen plaintiffs’ injuries represented a much more severe
intrusion into a constitutionally protected interest.
Minimally, then, we can conclude that the “directness” of an injury—in
and of itself—is an inadequate justification for providing or withholding
relief.  It is not the case, as Posner and others have implied, that indirect
injuries are necessarily “trivial” or that they necessarily represent only minor
intrusions into constitutionally protected interests.174  In fact, the CAP rule
does an especially poor job of selecting the “best” litigants if that category is
understood to include plaintiffs who have the most at stake (as compared to
other potential plaintiffs) or plaintiffs who suffered severe constitutional
165 Id. at 753–56.  The Court agreed that the injury complained of was generally cogni-
zable, stating, “There can be no doubt that this sort of noneconomic injury is one of the
most serious consequences of discriminatory government action and is sufficient in some
circumstances to support standing.” Id. at 755.  But the Court concluded that these partic-
ular plaintiffs lacked standing because they were not “personally denied equal treatment.”
Id. (quoting Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 740 (1984)).
166 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“[T]he policy of separat-
ing the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group.  A sense
of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.  Segregation with the sanction of
law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of
negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a
racial[ly] integrated school system.” (alterations in original) (quoting the findings of the
U.S. District Court of Kansas)).
167 Allen, 468 U.S. at 757 (identifying plaintiffs’ injury as “indirect”).
168 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
169 Id. at 529.
170 Id. at 536.  Despite his standing and cognizable interest, however, the Court ulti-
mately held that Taylor could not recover due to his failure to exhaust an adequate state-
law remedial procedure. Id. at 543–44.
171 See id. at 536–37 (“[R]espondent’s claim satisfies three prerequisites of a valid due
process claim: the petitioners acted under color of state law; the hobby kit falls within the
definition of property; and the alleged loss, even though negligently caused, amounted to
a deprivation.”).
172 Allen, 468 U.S. at 755, 757.
173 See id. at 739–40.
174 See Am. Bottom Conservancy v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 650 F.3d 652, 656 (7th
Cir. 2011).
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intrusions.  It follows that the direct-versus-trivial dichotomy requires an addi-
tional principle or explanation to justify categorically excluding “indirectly”
injured plaintiffs.
Similarly, if the purpose of the CAP rule is to include those plaintiffs
who have the most at stake in the litigation, the direct-versus-trivial fiction
leads to ironic and absurd results.  Because the CAP rule includes plaintiffs
like Taylor who suffer trifling but particularized economic injuries but
excludes those like the Allen plaintiffs who suffer grave but “indirect” stig-
matic injuries, the rule creates an incentive for those wishing to bring consti-
tutional challenges to seek out plaintiffs who happen to have suffered trivial
economic injuries that are clearly collateral to the primary wrong of the con-
stitutional violation.175
This point is illustrated by the CREW litigation.176  In their suit, the
group Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington is similarly situ-
ated to Posner’s hypothetical “California group” in that both groups have an
interest in challenging a governmental action, and each group must find a
plaintiff with a sufficiently “direct” injury to satisfy the CAP rule.  For CREW,
clearing this hurdle means finding individuals who may have been inciden-
tally harmed by the alleged presidential disloyalty.177  Toward that end,
CREW has put forth, inter alia, bellboys who claim to have suffered a loss of
tips as a result of a fundamental breach in the President’s duty of fidelity to
the United States.178  It is an understatement to say that such a cynical pos-
ture—which is necessitated by the bifurcated pragmatics of CAP—debases
the character of the claim at hand.179  Insofar as the CREW case succeeds in
175 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998) (holding that plain-
tiffs who lost a limited tax benefit that Congress had enacted to facilitate the acquisition of
processing plants had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the line-item veto
under the Presentment Clause of the Constitution).
176 CREW Second Amended Complaint, supra note 3.
177 Id. at 53–56 (listing as plaintiffs, inter alia, the owner of hotels that compete with
Trump hotels for business and an event planner who books events at hotels that compete
with Trump hotels).
178 Id. at 51–52 (arguing that the amount the plaintiffs receive in tips “depends on the
amount of business that the restaurants that employ them are able to attract,” and that
accordingly the plaintiffs “have been harmed and will be harmed, by loss of income, due to
Defendant’s receipt of benefits from foreign states, the United States, and various state
governments”).
179 For example, there are currently several pending lawsuits challenging the constitu-
tionality of the Trump administration’s announced plan to rescind the administrative pro-
gram known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). See DACA Litigation
Timeline, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., https://www.nilc.org/issues/daca/daca-litigation-time-
line/ (last updated Sept. 28, 2019).  One lawsuit was brought by the University of Califor-
nia, which alleged standing based, in part, on the fact that it had expended resources to
recruit DACA students and that those resources will have been wasted if the DACA stu-
dents are deported.  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F.
Supp. 3d 1011, 1033–34 (N.D. Cal. 2018).  However, the most compelling basis for these
suits is the claim that rescission of the program violates the due process rights of DACA
recipients.  To premise standing in that case on the fact that a university will have
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describing a constitutional intrusion, that intrusion is not meaningfully con-
nected to the loss suffered by a bellboy who might otherwise have gotten
greater tips.180  To require litigants to engage in such disingenuous theatrics
is demeaning to the enterprise of constitutional litigation and its central role
in the creation and vindication of constitutional norms.  It is likewise
demeaning to the federal courts—both lower and appellate—which must
engage in rhetorical gymnastics to separate the direct and “particularized”
wheat from the indirect, “generalized” chaff, as though there were a princi-
pled distinction to be made between them.181
This final point highlights a concerning consequence of the CAP rule’s
failure to serve as a qualitative control.  The CAP’s failure to provide a princi-
pled means for excluding cases—particularly in high-profile cases, as in the
emoluments context—poses more than a de minimis threat to the perceived
neutrality and integrity of the federal courts.182  The CAP rule means that a
case seeking to vindicate a fundamental constitutional norm may be
brought—or not brought—based on the happenstance of the existence and
cooperation of a person who has suffered a collateral injury from the consti-
tutional wrong.  A rule that affords and denies access to the courts in accor-
dance with happenstance is an unsatisfying rule at best, and an unjustifiable
rule at worst.
Moreover, by misconstruing constitutional injury as a toggle (i.e., if the
injury is not “direct” it must be “trivial”) the CAP rule wholly omits from its
analysis an important class of constitutional violations for which the concept
of a “particularized” injury is nonsensical.  As we will see in the following
Section, rather than representing a toggle, constitutional injuries can be
more accurately understood as falling along a spectrum of specificity.  Under-
standing constitutional injury as a spectrum of specificity creates a more
nuanced model of constitutional harm, and a model that can better illumi-
nate the fiduciary injury that follows from an emoluments violation.  A discus-
sion of that model follows.
B. Undifferentiated Constitutional Injuries
In United States v. Richardson, the Supreme Court announced that “undif-
ferentiated” harms that are “common to all members of the public” are not
expended unnecessary recruitment dollars diminishes the gravity of the underlying consti-
tutional value at stake.
180 CREW Second Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at 51–52.
181 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
182 Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 614 (2004) (“Underlying
much of this criticism [of standing doctrine] is a common belief: Federal judges make
standing decisions according to their own political and personal preferences, with little
concern for existing legal precedent.  This belief is not based on mere intuition—critics
point to a range of qualitative and quantitative studies that confirm the correlation
between judicial ideology and standing outcomes.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-3\NDL301.txt unknown Seq: 32 28-FEB-20 12:07
984 notre dame law review [vol. 95:3
sufficient to confer Article III standing.183  Plaintiff Richardson complained
that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was not reporting expenditures in
compliance with the Constitution, and that, as a taxpayer who participated in
funding those expenditures, he was injured.184  The Court, however,
explained:
While we can hardly dispute that this respondent has a genuine interest in
the use of funds and that his interest may be prompted by his status as a
taxpayer, he has not alleged that, as a taxpayer, he is in danger of suffering
any particular concrete injury as a result of the operation of this statute.185
  Richardson would be no more harmed than any other taxpayer should it
turn out that the CIA is making improper use of taxpayer dollars.186  Despite
the fact that Richardson alleged a constitutional violation, the Court con-
cluded that such conflicts are better resolved through the political
process.187
This early standing language of “differentiated” and “undifferentiated”
harms is more analytically helpful in understanding constitutional injuries
than the “concrete” and “particularized” language that the Court favors in
later cases or the “direct” and “trivial” language supplied by Posner.  The
concept of an undifferentiated injury is one that falls indiscriminately on all
of the people.  It is an injury to which no one person or entity can lay special
claim.  It is a night that finds us all.  This is a very different idea than a “gen-
eralized” or “nonparticularized” injury that may affect a large number of peo-
ple—but not necessarily all of the people.  Similarly, a generalized or
nonparticularized injury may, presumably, affect different people or entities
in different ways.  In contrast, an undifferentiated injury affects all of the
people and it affects them each in exactly the same way.
Some types of constitutional provisions seem designed primarily to pro-
tect us from differentiated injuries while others seem designed to primarily
protect us from undifferentiated injuries.  For example, the Constitution
undoubtedly articulates a set of what are known as “individual rights,”188
such as the right to be free from unreasonable seizures.189  The hallmark of
an individual right is that it can be directly enforced by the individual who
has suffered its deprivation.190  So for example, when an individual is subject
183 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974) (quoting Ex parte Le´vitt, 302
U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam)).
184 Id. at 176.
185 Id. at 177.
186 Id. at 176–77.
187 Id. at 178–79.  It should be noted that the Court has allowed a limited exception to
taxpayer standing in the context of enforcing the Establishment Clause.  Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 105–06 (1968).  This exception is discussed in greater detail infra Part III.
188 Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1132–33,
1205 (1991) (challenging the conception of the Bill of Rights as concerned primarily with
individual rights and arguing instead that the rights cannot be understood without also
considering the structure).
189 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
190 See Amar, supra note 188, at 1178.
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to an unreasonable seizure owing to an excessive use of force, that individual
can sue to recover damages.191
However, we might also conceive of the Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable seizures more broadly.  We could imagine it embody-
ing two distinct guarantees.192 The first promise is directed exclusively to
those who are specifically physically harmed by excessive force.193  It is a
promise that we will not be physically harmed by the government.194  The
enforcement mechanism for this first guarantee is a remedy that can only be
exercised by those who personally experience excess force.  However, the sec-
ond guarantee is broader.  The second guarantee is a promise to all of the
people (whether they personally experience excess force or not) that the
United States is a country where such things do no occur (or, at least, that
they do not occur with impunity).195  The second guarantee is a promise
about the kind of government that the Constitution has “ordain[ed] and
establish[ed].”196
It is axiomatic that the Constitution represents a set of guarantees to the
people about the kind of government it ordains and establishes.  Each indi-
vidual provision of the Constitution describes a normative commitment to
engage in (or forego) certain behaviors, and that commitment is both bind-
ing on successive generations and legally enforceable.  When a constitutional
provision is violated—as when the government uses excessive force—the peo-
ple (both individually and collectively) can be said to be injured by the
breach of the promise.  In such a case, the government has failed to be the
kind of government that the Constitution has guaranteed to the people.
So when individual-right guarantees are violated, there are differenti-
ated injuries and undifferentiated injuries.197  Differentiated injuries are
injuries that happen to someone because of who they are and how they are
connected to the underlying events.198  Differentiated injuries include, for
191 See id. at 1180.
192 See id. at 1177 (“In the Fourth Amendment . . . we need not view the phrase ‘the
people’ as sounding solely in collective, political terms . . . .  [I]n the Fourth Amendment,
as nowhere else in the Constitution, the collective-sounding phrase ‘the people’ is immedi-
ately qualified by the use and subsequent repetition of the more individualistic language of
‘persons.’  The Amendment’s text seems to move quickly from the public to the private,
from the political to the personal . . . .”).
193 Id.
194 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (guaranteeing no unreasonable searches and seizures).
195 Stating that this is a promise of the Fourth Amendment is not to say that it is or has
been realized.
196 See Amar, supra note 188, at 1153 (alterations in original) (quoting U.S. CONST.
pmbl.); see also id. at 1177 (describing the collective—or political—versus individual
dimensions of the Fourth Amendment).
197 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974) (describing undifferentiated
injuries as “common to all members of the public” (quoting Ex parte Le´vitt, 302 U.S. 633,
634 (1937) (per curiam))).
198 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983).  In Lyons the Court held
that the plaintiff, Lyons, had a differentiated injury insofar as he was personally the subject
of a police chokehold, and that differentiated injury was sufficient to afford Lyons “stand-
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example, the physical suffering endured by the victim of excessive force.199
On the other hand, in the context of an unreasonable seizure, the undifferen-
tiated injury is the injury that follows from the failure of the government to be
the kind of government that it has promised to be.200  For the purpose of this
discussion, we can think of this injury as a “character-of-government,” or
COG, injury.  While the physical harm of excess force falls uniquely upon the
victim, the injury that follows from the failure of the government to live up to
its promise to be the kind of country that does not use excessive force falls
indifferently and equally upon each (and all) of the people.201  Because the
promise is made to each (and all) of the people indiscriminately, the benefit
of that particular constitutional guarantee falls indiscriminately upon the
people.
Consider, for example, Armstrong v. Village of Pinehurst, an excessive-use-
of-force case recently decided by the Fourth Circuit.202  Ronald Armstrong
suffered from bipolar disorder and paranoid schizophrenia.203  He had been
off his medication for several days and was behaving in a manner that con-
cerned his sister, Jinia Armstrong Lopez, so Lopez persuaded Arnold to
accompany her to a local hospital.204  While undergoing the process to be
admitted, Armstrong became alarmed and left the facility.205  Based on his
admitting interview, the admitting doctor deemed Armstrong to be a danger
to himself and the doctor signed papers authorizing an involuntary commit-
ment.206  The police were called to retrieve Armstrong and return him to the
hospital.207  The police encountered Armstrong and his sister a short dis-
tance away from the hospital.208  When approached by police, Armstrong was
not combative, but he clung to a stop sign pole when they tried to take him
back to the hospital.209  The police responded by tasing him five times within
two minutes, which killed him.210
ing to claim damages against the individual officers” but insufficient to confer standing for
prospective injunctive relief to enjoin the practice.  Because all citizens faced the same risk
of future assault by police, Lyon’s claim to prospective harm was undifferentiated.
199 Id.
200 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1992) (describing an undifferenti-
ated injury as an “assertion of a right to a particular kind of Government conduct, which
the Government has violated by acting differently” (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
754 (1984))).
201 See id.
202 Estate of Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong v. Vill. of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892 (4th Cir.
2016).
203 Id. at 896.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 897–98.
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Clearly Ronald Armstrong suffered a differentiated harm.211  He was
injured because of who he was and his relationship to the underlying events:
he was the person whose body received tens of thousands of amps of electric-
ity.212  Ronald Armstrong, and only Ronald Armstrong, lost his life.213  His
harm is distinguishable from the harms that befell others.  Armstrong’s sister
was also uniquely harmed because of who she is and her relationship to the
underlying events.  She not only lost her brother but also witnessed his suffer-
ing and his death.214  The harm she suffered is distinct from Ronald’s injury.
Others also were likely harmed by the excessive use of force.215  The doctor,
witnesses, other friends, and loved ones of Ronald all were likely injured by
the constitutional violation.  These harms are all differentiated harms—that
is, harms that are specific to those people and their relationship to the
underlying events.
But the rest of us were harmed as well.  We were harmed when our gov-
ernment violated the guarantee that it would execute seizures in a reasonable
manner.  It is important to be clear that this harm arises not from the failure
of law enforcement (or other government officials) to exercise their discre-
tion in a manner that comports with our expectations of what they should
do—that is, what we think the best course of action would have been.216  It is
likewise not a harm that arises from the want of a perfect government.  In the
specific case of the Fourth Amendment, the doctrine provides ample room to
make reasonable mistakes.  For example, in the Armstrong circumstance, the
Fourth Amendment does not require that the officers employ “state of the
art” or “best practices” in executing their duty to safeguard the well-being of
a mentally ill man.217  The Fourth Amendment allows officers room to make
reasonable mistakes.  Tasing a nonthreatening mentally ill person five times
in two minutes was simply not a reasonable mistake, and the Constitution
does not provide room for officers to make unreasonable mistakes.  When
unreasonable mistakes are made, every one of the people suffers the harm
that follows from the broken guarantee: we were promised one sort of a gov-
ernment, but we were given another.  It is a character-of-government injury
that falls indiscriminately upon all of us.
In this way, the harm that follows from constitutional violations can be
said to fall along a continuum of specificity.  One end of the spectrum is
211 See id.
212 See id.
213 Id. at 898.
214 Id. at 897 (“Lopez was the first to notice that her brother was unresponsive, so she
asked the officers to check on him.”).
215 See id. at 906 (“Appellees used excessive force, in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.”).
216 See, e.g., id. at 900 (listing both “ideal” and less than ideal methods for officers to
reasonably seize a suspect they know to be mentally ill—all of which would have been
constitutional—while noting that the Constitution requires that officers minimally make
efforts to “de-escalate the situation and adjust the application of force downward” (quoting
Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 962 (6th Cir. 2013))).
217 See id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-3\NDL301.txt unknown Seq: 36 28-FEB-20 12:07
988 notre dame law review [vol. 95:3
occupied by the individual directly affected by the breach—for example,
Ronald Armstrong, the victim who was physically harmed and suffered a
unique and acute injury.218  The opposite end of the spectrum is occupied by
those among the people who have no connection to the victim or the event
and who therefore suffer only the undifferentiated injury of their govern-
ment having failed to live up to its promise.
Between these two poles lies everyone else.  The family and friends of
Ronald Armstrong occupy a space on the continuum nearer to the victim
himself.  Their injuries are more specific than someone entirely unconnected
to the event.  Similarly, those who live in the same city and who fear similar
treatment at the hands of the police perhaps likewise occupy a portion of the
continuum nearer the individual victim.  On the farther end of the contin-
uum are those among the people whose lives and prospects are less affected
by the particular constitutional violation in question, perhaps because they
have a low likelihood of interacting with that particular aspect of govern-
ment.  However, even those on the farthest end of specificity continuum suf-
fer a character-of-government injury that is identical to the victim himself
with respect to the breach of the promise to be a government that does not
use excessive force.
1. Primary and Collateral Differentiated Injuries
When we consider constitutional injuries along a continuum of specific-
ity we see that when the Court makes a determination about whether an
injury is “particularized,” the distinction the Court draws is a question of
degree rather than a difference in kind.  Moreover, we see that the concept
of “particularized” as it is used in this context is not at all helpful in distin-
guishing between Armstrong’s injury and the injury of a bystander.  If we
were to pragmatically select the “best plaintiff” (i.e., the one with the most at
stake) to challenge the constitutionality of repeatedly tasing a noncombative
mentally ill person, Armstrong’s estate would clearly be that “best plaintiff,”
as Armstrong had the most at stake.219  Yet if a bystander brought a challenge
arguing that he suffered psychological injury as a result of witnessing the
encounter, the CAP rule would not help to exclude him.  The bystander’s
injury is particularized, even though it is not the primary injury that the
Fourth Amendment seeks to avoid.
In fact, of these many injuries we could plot along the Armstrong spec-
trum of harm, the character-of-government injury alone would be insuffi-
cient to confer standing under the CAP rule.  Of the Armstrong harms, only
the COG injury is “generalized” rather than concrete and particular.  An
application of the CAP rule would therefore disallow the COG injury, which
is consistent with the Supreme Court’s disinclination to serve as a vehicle for
218 Id. at 898.
219 See id.
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ensuring the proper functioning of government.220  But in describing the
Armstrong spectrum of harm, there were many differentiated injuries that
were also clearly collateral to the harm done to Mr. Armstrong himself.  Arm-
strong’s sister and doctor, for example, each suffered differentiated, con-
crete, and particularized harm as a result of the constitutional violation.
Although Armstrong’s sister herself was not seized, she suffered a particular-
ized injury as the result of an unconstitutional seizure.  More significantly,
Armstrong’s sister’s injury is not a character-of-government injury.  Arm-
strong’s sister’s injury is a claim about how the Fourth Amendment violation
harmed her in particular.
But the Fourth Amendment promises that we will not be unreasonably
seized—which is not the same as a promise that we will not witness an unrea-
sonable seizure and suffer because of it.221  In this light, the injuries borne by
Armstrong’s sister and doctor are collateral to the injury suffered by Arm-
strong himself.222  That is not to say they were not serious injuries, that they
were trivial, that they were insufficiently direct, or that there was an insuffi-
cient causal nexus between the injury and the unconstitutional behavior—
each of those are different concepts altogether.  Instead, by “collateral” I
mean to describe harm that does not mirror the primary benefit conferred
by the constitutional promise.  To locate the primary injury that follows from
a Fourth Amendment violation, we might ask: Were this plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment rights violated?223  In the case of Armstrong’s sister and doctor,
the answer is no.224
To focus on the primary injury along the Armstrong continuum of harm
makes for a more coherent and parsimonious standard, and one that is more
likely to advance the pragmatic aims of the CAP rule.  In fact, this method of
identifying the primary injury is already the tacit but de facto practice of the
Supreme Court in locating standing in individual-rights cases.225
220 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968) (observing that “generalized grievances
about the conduct of government” are disallowed).
221 See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (“Fourth Amendment
rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicari-
ously asserted.” (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389–90 (1968))).
222 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978) (“[T]he rights secured by [the Fourth]
Amendment are personal . . . .”).
223 See id. at 132 (“[T]he person seeking to challenge the legality of a search . . . [must
be] the ‘victim’ of the search or seizure.” (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261
(1960))).
224 Jones, 362 U.S. at 261 (“In order to qualify as a ‘person aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure’ one must have been a victim of a search or seizure . . . .” (quoting FED.
R. CRIM. P. 41(e)).
225 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139 (“[W]e think the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the
extent of a particular defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any
theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing.”).
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2. The Primary-Injury Model in Individual-Rights Cases
The Court has long recognized that the CAP rule is overinclusive in the
context of individual-rights cases.226  The CAP rule allows collateral harms as
long as they are particularized and are sufficiently causally related to the ille-
gal conduct.227  However, in the context of Fourth Amendment and other
individual-rights provisions, the Court has recognized that whether a harm is
particularized (i.e., differentiated) or generalized (i.e., undifferentiated) is
not the most salient question.228  Instead, the most salient question is
whether the plaintiff has been harmed in a manner that the Constitution
promised they would not be harmed.229  It is primary rather than collateral
harms that confer standing in individual-rights contexts.230  To explain its
departure from the CAP rule in this context, the Court has attempted to
describe its approach as an idiosyncrasy mandated by the particulars of the
Fourth Amendment guarantee.231  The Court has stated, “Fourth Amend-
ment rights are personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously asserted,”232
and the personal right at issue is the right to be free from unreasonable
search or seizure.  Thus, in this context, the Supreme Court has abandoned
the CAP rule and supplanted it with a more parsimonious question: Have the
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights been violated?233
Similarly, the primary-injury model has been utilized in the context of
the Fifth Amendment234 and the Eighth Amendment.235  In both instances,
the question is: Has the plaintiff been harmed in a way that the Constitution
has promised she would not be harmed?236  In these individual-rights con-
226 Alderman, 394 U.S. at 174 (holding that injuries suffered by parties who were not
subject to the search do not confer standing in the Fourth Amendment context, even if the
injuries are concrete and causally connected to a violation).
227 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998) (allowing collaterally
injured plaintiffs to allege a violation of the Presentment Clause).
228 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 138–39 (rejecting the CAP metric in the context of the Fourth
Amendment).
229 Id. at 140 (holding that the question of whether a defendant has standing depends
upon “whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest of the defendant
which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect”).
230 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960).
231 See id.
232 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133–34 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174
(1969)).
233 Id. at 139 (stating that standing in the Fourth Amendment context “is more prop-
erly subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine”).
234 United States v. Richardson, 1 F. Supp. 2d 495, 497 (D.V.I. 1998) (“[I]t is clear that
the general rule is that defendants do not have standing to raise a third-party’s Fifth
Amendment violations for their own defense.”).
235 Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1014–15 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (arguing
that an inmate’s mother who sought to challenge her son’s scheduled execution under the
Eighth Amendment lacked standing to petition on his behalf because he was not incompe-
tent); id. at 1017 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[A] third party has no standing to litigate an
Eighth Amendment claim . . . on [the plaintiff’s] behalf.”).
236 See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133–34.
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texts, the primary harm is one that mirrors the constitutional promise, and a
collateral harm is one that is caused by a constitutional violation but does not
mirror the constitutional promise.
The Court’s abandonment of CAP in the context of individual-rights
provisions is a step in the right direction towards focusing on primary injuries
rather than particularized harms in constitutional claim cases.  The appropri-
ate next step is to apply that intuition across the board in the contexts of all
constitutional claims.  A consistent, universal focus on primary harms in cases
involving constitutional claims would bring coherence and parsimony to a
doctrinal area that is beset with idiosyncratic, byzantine rules and the percep-
tion of inconsistent (and even politicized) application.237  But even in
absence of a universal application of the primary-injury model across all con-
stitutional claims, the primary-injury model is especially compelling in the
specific and narrow context of the Emoluments Clause.
3. Emoluments Harms as Undifferentiated Harms
We have seen that when individual rights like the Fourth Amendment
are violated, differentiated and undifferentiated harms follow.  Indeed, both
classes of harm always follow the violation of an individual right, because the
victim always suffers a specific kind of injury, while the people suffer an
undifferentiated character-of-government injury.
It follows, too, that we might just as easily cast this proposition in terms
of benefits rather than harms.  Where constitutional harms are differenti-
ated, so too are constitutional benefits.  Consider again Ronald Arm-
strong.238  Just as Armstrong was uniquely harmed by the violation of the
Fourth Amendment, so too would he have been uniquely protected by the
Fourth Amendment had its prohibitions been observed by the officers that
he encountered.  Had the officers who encountered Armstrong that day
been both aware of the contours of the Fourth Amendment and inclined to
regulate their behavior accordingly, the Fourth Amendment would have
saved Armstrong’s life.239
What is the nature of the benefit provided by the Emoluments Clause?
It is clear the Clause is a prohibition.  The text plainly prohibits a class of
behavior (accepting foreign emoluments without the consent of Congress)
by a class of actors (a “Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust” under
the United States).240  Professor Zephyr Teachout has argued that clauses
like the Emoluments Clause provide a bulwark against corruption in the fed-
eral government.241  We might imagine other benefits of the Emoluments
237 See Elliott, supra note 13, at 463–64 (“[S]tanding is ill-suited to most of the functions
it is asked to serve, and . . . forcing standing into this variety of roles contributes to the
scathing critiques leveled against the doctrine.”).
238 Estate of Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong v. Vill. of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892 (4th Cir.
2016).
239 See id. at 898.
240 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
241 Teachout, supra note 1, at 359–62.
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Clause, but virtually all plausible benefits revolve around an aligned premise:
we prohibit federal officers from secretly accepting valuable gifts from for-
eign governments to prevent officers from using the power of their office to
encourage or elicit such gifts, because such behavior would conflict with the
officers’ duty to act solely in the best interests of the United States.242
Prohibiting the gifts, then, has the beneficial effect of removing a secret con-
flict of interest that would otherwise exist between officers’ personal financial
interests and the interests of the United States.  The absence of the secret
conflict of interest makes it more likely that an officer will act in the interests
of the United States.  It is a benefit that attends the imposition of any duty of
loyalty.
If the benefit of the Emoluments Clause is to increase the likelihood that
federal officer will act in the interest of the United States, then the Emolu-
ments Clause confers an undifferentiated benefit on the people and the
denial of that benefit imposes an undifferentiated harm on the people.
Moreover, the violation of the Emoluments Clause only imposes an
undifferentiated primary harm.  Unlike an unreasonable seizure, which can
happen to one person at a time, the risks attendant to a disloyal federal
officer happen to all the people simultaneously.  No one person or entity is
closer to that injury on the continuum of specificity than any other.  No one
person among the people benefits any more than any other from having fed-
eral officers act in the best interest of the United States.243  Constitutional
provisions that are designed to protect the integrity of the government itself
confer undifferentiated benefits and impose undifferentiated harms, as each
of the people has an equal and undifferentiated interest in the integrity of
government of the United States.
To identify the primary harm of an Emoluments Clause violation, we can
ask the same question that underlies the Supreme Court’s individual-rights
standing determinations: What character of injury mirrors the constitutional
promise that has been broken?  If the promise is that federal officers will not
accept secret bribes and thus be potentially vulnerable to foreign influence,
then the injury that mirrors that promise is the injury of living in a country in
which a federal officer has accepted a secret bribe and is therefore suscepti-
ble to foreign influence in exactly the manner that the Constitution promises
will not happen.  We could propose a hypothetical plaintiff and ask: Has this
person been harmed in a way that the Constitution has promised that she
would not be?  If the plaintiff is one of “the People” to whom the constitu-
tional promise inures, then the answer will always be yes.
While some individuals may benefit collaterally as a result of policy deci-
sions that are made by uncorrupted officers (assuming they would have made
other, less favorable, decisions in the absence of the Emoluments Clause),
242 Id.
243 The Clause confers a second undifferentiated benefit that is identical to the undif-
ferentiated benefit that all constitutional provisions provide.  It provides the benefit that
follows from the government’s binding commitment to being a certain type of
government.
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those benefits are ancillary to or coincidental with the behavior the Clause
regulates.  An examination follows of the kinds of primary and collateral inju-
ries that might arise in the context of the pending emoluments litigation.
4. Primary and Collateral Emoluments Violations: Services Rendered and
Foreign State Favors
While there are many ways in which the Emoluments Clause might be
violated, the facts alleged by the CREW, MD/DC, and DEM complaints pro-
vide a ready example of emoluments violations that might arise as the result
of a sitting President choosing not to divest from his private business holding
prior to taking office.  There are two scenarios in which a violation of the
Emoluments Clause might occur as the result of a sitting President’s private
business holdings.244  First, a business owned by the President could accept a
payment from a foreign government in exchange for goods or services.245
We might think of this as a “services-rendered” scenario, and it could arise,
for example, if a representative of a foreign head of state stays at a Trump
hotel and pays the hotel for services rendered.246  Second, a Trump business
operating abroad may receive a valuable legal or trade concession from a
foreign government.247  We might of think this as a “foreign-state-favors” sce-
nario.  Assuming the foreign state afforded a Trump-held business a favor or
concession that contributed to the monetary value of the President’s busi-
ness, the Emoluments Clause could be implicated.248
Since President Trump’s inauguration, both the services-rendered scena-
rio and the foreign-state-favors scenario have been implicated by real-world
events, raising a complex of novel questions about whether and how the For-
eign Emoluments Clause applies to businesses that are owned by a sitting
President.  Professors Laurence Tribe, Erwin Chemerinsky, and Zephyr
Teachout have recently tested some of these questions in the CREW litiga-
tion.249  The violations alleged by the original and amended complaints are
largely of the “services-rendered” variety, including issues arising from leases
in Trump Tower that are held by foreign-government-owned entities and
issues arising from foreign-government representatives staying in the Presi-
dent’s D.C. hotel.250
244 See DEM Complaint, supra note 3, at 18; MD/DC Complaint, supra note 3, at 2;
CREW Complaint, supra note 3, at 3; CREW Second Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at
3.
245 These potential violations would be cured if the President sought and received the
consent of Congress to accept the payment.
246 See, e.g., CREW Second Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at 3.
247 See, e.g., MD/DC Complaint, supra note 3, at 4.
248 See id. at 4 (alleging that President Trump violated the Foreign Emoluments Clause
by receiving payments from foreign governments and those acting on their behalf).
249 See generally CREW Second Amended Complaint, supra note 3.
250 See CREW Complaint, supra note 3, at 3 (complaining of services-rendered viola-
tions); First Amended Complaint at 3, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v.
Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 17-0458) [hereinafter CREW First
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The MD/DC litigation alleges that the “foreign-state-favors” scenario was
implicated when China granted President Trump a valuable trademark in his
surname.251  President Trump had been seeking that legal protection for
more than a decade.252  Five days after President Trump won the presidential
election China reversed its previous decade-long position and provisionally
granted the trademark.253  The final approval of the trademark was granted
just days after President Trump publicly expressed support to China’s Presi-
dent Xi Jinping for the “One China” policy, a policy that President Trump
had previously called into question.254  Senator Dianne Feinstein of Califor-
nia publicly commented on the trademark grant, stating, “If this isn’t a viola-
tion of the Emoluments Clause, I don’t know what is.”255
The question of who has the power to enforce the Emoluments Clause
unearths a series of uncomfortable paradoxes within the Supreme Court’s
standing jurisprudence.  For example, an application of the Court’s “con-
crete and particularized” rule to the President Trump trademark issue could
confer standing exclusively to an American business operating in China that
currently uses the name “Trump” without obtaining a license from President
Trump.  The idea that businesses in China that are competing for the use of
the “Trump” name are potentially the only private entities that have the
power to enforce a constitutional provision designed to protect the American
people from disloyalty in our public officials strains credulity, even within the
contorted confines of the doctrine of constitutional standing.
An application of the CAP rule could potentially confer exclusive stand-
ing on a plaintiff to bring a constitutional claim against a sitting President
based on lost profits arising out of a trademark dispute simply because the
lost profits constitute a direct and particularized injury.  That rule would
deny standing based on the very injury the Emoluments Clause was designed
to protect against, while granting standing for a very attenuated collateral
injury.  Under that rule, a plaintiff who suffers an economic injury will have
standing, while a plaintiff who complains that the sitting President is violating
his fiduciary duty would be turned away, despite the fact that the fiduciary
injury is both the primary injury and the injury that the Emoluments Clause
is designed to abate.
Amended Complaint] (same); CREW Second Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at 3
(maintaining complaints of the services-rendered variety first made in the original
complaint).
251 MD/DC Complaint, supra note 3, at 21–22.
252 Jackie Northam, China Grants Trump a Valuable Trademark Registration, NPR (Feb. 16,
2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/02/16/515589191/china-grants-
President President Trump-a-valuable-trademark-registration.
253 Id.
254 Lincoln Feast, Timeline: Trump Questions Then Honors “One China” Policy, REUTERS
(Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-china-xi-timeline/time
line-trump-questions-then-honors-one-china-policy-idUSKBN15P0OQ; Jeremy Venook, The
Story Behind Trump’s Chinese Trademark, ATLANTIC (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.the
atlantic.com/business/archive/2017/02/trump-chinese-trademark/517458/.
255 Venook, supra note 254 (quoting Senator Feinstein).
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Similarly, in the services-rendered scenario in which a representative of a
foreign state stays in a Trump-owned hotel and pays for services rendered,
application of the CAP rule could mean that only hotels competing with Pres-
ident Trump’s hotel for business would have standing to sue to enforce the
Clause.  Understandably, plaintiffs in the CREW, MD/DC, and DEM lawsuits
have sought to meet the Court’s articulated injury-in-fact standard by plead-
ing concrete and particularized injuries that are differentiated from injuries
that each American suffers when the President fails to abide by the law.256
The CREW litigation provides an example of this strategy.257  In its original
complaint, CREW alleged that it was personally and concretely harmed by
the President’s alleged emoluments violations because it was obliged to
spend additional resources in response to the President’s emoluments-
related actions.258  Because CREW is a nonprofit directed at monitoring gov-
ernment corruption, the President’s alleged corruption caused the organiza-
tion to undertake more work at additional expense.259  Later in the
litigation, CREW amended its complaint to add as plaintiffs an association of
restaurants and restaurant workers and individuals employed by hotels that
compete with Trump-branded properties.260  The amended complaint
alleged that the newcomer plaintiffs were injured by the emoluments viola-
tions because the violations caused businesses that compete with Trump-
branded properties to lose business, and their employees to lose wages and
tips.261
As a litigation strategy, it is imperative that plaintiffs in the CREW, MD/
DC, and DEM litigations plead personal and monetizable injuries such as loss
of business or loss of wages.262  Yet it is difficult to reconcile these types of
injuries with the history and structure of the Emoluments Clause.  It is diffi-
cult to imagine that the same people who were worried about a betrayal
along the lines of Charles II would be persuaded that a cause of action
should lie with competing hotels for loss of profits, but not with an ordinary
citizen seeking to enforce the fiduciary duty of the executive branch.263
More significantly, the viability of an Emoluments Clause challenge is
much too constitutionally significant to turn on the happenstance and availa-
bility of collaterally injured token plaintiffs.  The CREW and MD/DC litiga-
tions offer concrete demonstrations of the precariousness of relying on token
256 See DEM Complaint, supra note 3, at 49–51; MD/DC Complaint, supra note 3, at
31–41; CREW Second Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at 34–58.
257 See, e.g., CREW Second Amended Complaint, supra note 3.
258 CREW Complaint, supra note 3, at 23–32.
259 Id. at 23.
260 CREW First Amended Complaint, supra note 250, at 10, 44–53.
261 Id.
262 See, e.g., CREW Second Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at 6 (asserting loss of
business and loss of wages as a basis for standing).
263 See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174,
187–88 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (indicating a disbelief that the Framers intended the Emoluments
Clause to be a means of protecting anyone from competition), vacated and remanded, 939
F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2019).
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plaintiffs to enforce the President’s duty of loyalty to the people.  These cases
are examined in turn below.
C. Token Plaintiffs and Zones of Interest
At the time of publication, six federal court opinions have analyzed the
question of standing in the emoluments context.264  Each of these opinions
engages in the set of byzantine legal fictions that are necessitated by the CAP
rule’s insistence on token plaintiffs.  Unsurprisingly, the determination of
standing in each opinion turns on speculation, minutiae, and trivial factual
details that have nothing to do with presidential disloyalty.  It is also unsur-
prising (given the inherent malleability of the CAP rule) that each of the
opinions is at odds with one another in ways that render them vulnerable to
the longstanding criticism that standing lies in the eye of the beholder.
In this way, each opinion to date offers a concrete illustration of the
weakness of the CAP rule as applied to an emoluments case, and each also
serves to illustrate the superiority of a primary/collateral and differentiated/
undifferentiated injury analysis.265  Two U.S. district courts, one in the Dis-
trict of Maryland266 and one in the Southern District of New York,267 have
each rendered decisions coming to opposite conclusions on the question of
standing in the Emoluments Clause context.  The District Court for the Dis-
trict of Maryland found standing in the MD/DC case,268 while the District
Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the CREW case for
want of standing.269
Each of those district courts has also been subsequently reviewed by an
appellate court.270  The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court in the MD/
DC case for want of standing (although the Fourth Circuit has also granted a
264 Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45, 52–72 (D.D.C. 2018), rev’d and remanded,
No. 19-5237, 2020 WL 593891 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 7, 2020); Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in
Wash., 939 F.3d at 142–58; District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 738–53 (D.
Md. 2018), rev’d and remanded, In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 374–79 (4th Cir.), reh’g en banc
granted, 780 F. App’x 36 (4th Cir. 2019); Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 276 F.
Supp. 3d at 183–93.
265 The DEM litigation has produced two such opinions.  First, the trial court found
standing, despite the Supreme Court’s opinion in Raines v. Byrd, which denied standing to
aggrieved members of Congress under circumstances that were more favorable to finding
standing. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997) (denying standing to members of
Congress who argued that the line-item veto denied them their constitutionally committed
legislative role as articulated by the Presentment Clause); Blumenthal, 335 F. Supp. 3d at
55–57 (discussing Raines).  The D.C. Circuit, however, found no standing and directed the
trial court to dismiss the case. Blumenthal, 2020 WL 593891.  Given the weakness of the
plaintiffs’ standing arguments, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will weigh in.
266 District of Columbia, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725.
267 Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 276 F. Supp. 3d 174.
268 District of Columbia, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 757.
269 Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 276 F. Supp. 3d at 193, 195.
270 Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 939 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2019);
In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360 (4th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, 780 F. App’x 36 (4th Cir. 2019).
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rehearing en banc in the MD/DC case), while the Second Circuit reversed in
the CREW case, finding that the CREW plaintiffs had sufficient standing to
proceed.271  Consequently, at present there is a split between the Fourth Cir-
cuit and the Second Circuit regarding the question of standing in the emolu-
ments context.272  The cases are considered below.
1. The MD/DC Cases
The MD/DC district court found that the Maryland and the District of
Columbia sufficiently alleged that conference centers that they owned suf-
fered lost profits as a result of the alleged Emoluments Clause violations, and
that the injury the plaintiffs alleged was fairly traceable to the President’s
alleged constitutional violation.273  The MD/DC district court found that the
causal connection between the alleged lost profits and the Emoluments
Clause violations was not too attenuated to sustain standing, even though the
lost profits were caused—at least in part—by the decision of third parties to
stay at a Trump-owned hotel.274
It is notable that one of the reasons the MD/DC district court offered in
support of its causation conclusion was overtly practical.  The district court
stated that the causal connection is sufficient, in part, because to hold other-
wise would “render impossible any effort to ever engage in Foreign or
Domestic Emoluments Clause analysis because action by a foreign or domes-
tic government, i.e., by a third party, is always present by definition.”275
While the MD/DC district court’s inclination to engage the Emoluments
Clause is understandable, causation in standing is not usually supported by
the rationale that to find an insufficient causal nexus would destroy standing
and make it impossible for anyone to sue.276  It is a deeply pragmatic (and
arguably tautological) rationale, which seeks to preserve the opportunity for
the court to substantively engage with the Clause.277  While the MD/DC dis-
trict court’s impulse to evaluate the substance of the emoluments claims may
be laudable, this is exactly the type of rationale that could render the ruling
vulnerable to reversal on appeal.  This manner of rationale also fuels criti-
cism that application of the CAP rule is so porous and flexible that its appli-
271 In re Trump, 928 F.3d at 364, 379; In re Trump, 780 F. App’x at 37; Citizens for
Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 939 F.3d at 158, 160.
272 See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
273 District of Columbia, 291 F. Supp. 3d at 745.  The MD/DC district court also found
standing based on two very narrow categories of injury that only sovereign states are able to
advance: quasi-sovereign interests, and parens patriae interests. Id. at 742, 748.
274 Id. at 749–50.
275 Id. at 749.
276 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974)
(“The assumption that if respondents have no standing, no one would have standing, is not
a reason to find standing.”).
277 Id. at 489.
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cation frequently seems to serve primarily as a conduit for judicial
sensibilities about the merits of the underlying case.278
Indeed, the MD/DC district court’s standing conclusion was subse-
quently reversed by a panel of the Fourth Circuit composed of Judge
Niemeyer (who wrote the unanimous opinion), Judge Quattlebaum, and
Senior Judge Shedd.279  The Fourth Circuit panel offered two reasons for its
reversal.  First the panel held that “the connection between the Hospitality
Plaintiffs’ alleged injury and Defendant’s actions is too tenuous to satisfy Arti-
cle III’s causation requirement.”280  The Court noted that the plaintiffs were
likely to have faced increased competition as a result of Trump’s becoming
President (and thereby drawing greater interest and attention to his branded
properties) regardless of whether the Trump businesses accepted compensa-
tion for services rendered from foreign governments.  As a consequence, the
plaintiffs’ alleged lost profits could have resulted in increased business at the
Trump branded hotels regardless of any emoluments violation.281
Additionally, the panel concluded that government officials might con-
tinue to patronize Trump branded hotels even if the President were enjoined
from personally accepting those remunerations, since such payments would
still benefit members of the President’s family.  Consequently, the panel con-
cluded that the plaintiffs’ alleged injury was not redressable.282
The underlying difficulty faced by the MD/DC plaintiffs is that the wrong
that the MD/DC plaintiffs want to rectify is the wrong of the President
accepting money from foreign governments, which is a wrong that does not
fit within the CAP framework.  The harm of presidential corruption could be
redressed by a federal injunction, but only if the plaintiffs have standing.
However, because the CAP rule forces plaintiffs who want to enforce the
Emoluments Clause to depend upon collateral injuries, both the court and
the parties must engage in a charade about lost profits.
2. The CREW Decisions
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York took the
opposite approach to that of the MD/DC district court, initially granting a
motion to dismiss the CREW litigation based on lack of standing.283  The
CREW district court found that while lost tips and wages do constitute a par-
278 See Elliott, supra note 13, at 463–64 (noting that standing doctrine has been the
subject of “scathing critiques”).
279 In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360 (4th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, 780 F. App’x 36 (4th Cir.
2019).
280 Id. at 370 (quoting Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F.
Supp. 3d 174, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), vacated and remanded, 939 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2019)); see
also In re Trump, 928 F.3d at 371 (“The CREW court’s disagreement with the theory of
competitor standing embraced by the [District of Maryland] is fundamental and obvious,
and the [District of Maryland’s] suggestion to the contrary blinks reality.”).
281 In re Trump, 928 F. 3d at 376.
282 Id.
283 Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 276 F. Supp. 3d at 193, 195.
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ticularized injury in fact—thereby meeting the CAP requirement—the plain-
tiffs failed to allege that their injuries were caused by the alleged emoluments
violation.284  The CREW district court found the causal connection between
the President owning a hotel and lost wages or tips at competing hotels to be
too speculative.285  Significantly the CREW court drew also upon the “zone-
of-interests doctrine”—a doctrine usually reserved for statutory standing anal-
ysis286—to conclude: “Nothing in the text or the history of the Emoluments
Clauses suggests that the Framers intended these provisions to protect any-
one from competition.  The prohibitions contained in these Clauses arose
from the Framers’ concern with protecting the new government from cor-
ruption and undue influence.”287
The Second Circuit reversed the CREW district court, disagreeing on
every substantive point, including the CREW district court’s zone-of-interests
analysis.288  The Second Circuit correctly observed that the question of
whether the plaintiffs fell within the Emolument Clause’s “zone of interests”
was a question of whether the plaintiffs stated a claim under the clause, not a
question of standing.289  The Second Circuit also found the CREW district
court to be wrong on the merits in terms of applying the zone-of-interests
test, concluding:
Every Supreme Court decision construing the zone of interests test as it per-
tains to competitors’ suits supports the view that Plaintiffs satisfy the zone of
interests test.  Without exception, the Court has held that a plaintiff who
sues to enforce a law that limits the activity of a competitor satisfies the zone
of interests test even though the limiting law was not motivated by an inten-
tion to protect entities such as plaintiffs from competition.290
  This colloquy between the CREW and MD/DC district courts and the Sec-
ond and Fourth Circuits (whose opinion the Second Circuit directly
engaged) underscores the criticism that has so often been directed at stand-
ing doctrine—that standing is in the eye of the beholder.  Facing substan-
284 Id. at 184–86.
285 Id. at 186.
286 See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387
(2014) (“Whether a plaintiff comes within ‘the “zone of interests”’ is an issue that requires
us to determine, using traditional tools of statutory interpretation, whether a legislatively
conferred cause of action encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim.” (emphasis added) (quot-
ing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 97 (1998))).
287 Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 276 F. Supp. 3d at 187.  The court also
found that the CREW organization itself failed to allege an injury in fact in alleging that
the alleged Emoluments Clause violations forced it to divert increased resources to moni-
toring the violations. Id. at 188–93.  The court concluded that CREW’s decision to moni-
tor the violations was not necessitated by the President’s conduct in a manner that would
sustain an injury in fact. Id.
288 Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 939 F.3d 131, 142, 154 (2d
Cir. 2019) (“The district court thus misconstrued the nature of the zone of interests
doctrine.”).
289 Id. at 154.
290 Id.
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tially similar (and in some cases identical) facts, these courts have come to
opposite conclusions about causation and redressability, and have
announced those conclusions in opinions that are pointed and, at times,
even sarcastic.291
The reason for both the tone and incongruence is the fact that everyone
involved in these cases knows that the issue motivating the plaintiffs in each
case is not the concrete and particularized loss of profits or wages, but is
instead the wish to curb presidential disloyalty.  Each of these four courts
expressly or implicitly mention this underlying current of motivation.  For
example, the Second Circuit observed:
The Fourth Circuit expressed skepticism as to “why [the plaintiffs] came to
the court for relief in the first place,” implying that their motivation was
political and that this cast doubt on the federal court’s jurisdiction.  While it
is certainly possible that these lawsuits are fueled in part by political motiva-
tions, we do not understand the significance of that fact.  It is true that a
political motivation for a lawsuit, standing alone, is insufficient to confer
Article III standing.  But while the existence of a political motivation for a
lawsuit does not supply standing, nor does it defeat standing.292
  The elephant in the room, so to speak, is the fact that the CAP rule forces
both the litigants and the court to engage in a legal fiction centered on trivial
and collateral injuries.  This leads to a porous doctrine insofar as courts con-
script the doctrines of zone of interests, causation, and redressability to try to
make sense of the central failing of the CAP rule: the fact that it necessitates
token plaintiffs.  These problems could be resolved if, instead of trying to fit
square pegs into round holes, the doctrine of constitutional standing was
attentive to the two most salient metrics of constitutional injury: primary/
collateral and differentiated/undifferentiated.
3. The Zone-of-Interests and CAP Analysis Versus the Primary/Collateral
and Differentiated/Undifferentiated Injury Analysis
In some ways, the CREW district court’s application of the zone-of-inter-
ests doctrine is consistent with the argument advanced here: that the ques-
tion of standing in constitutional cases should turn upon whether the
plaintiff has suffered a primary (rather than collateral) injury, where “pri-
mary injury” is understood to reflect the primary promise made by the consti-
tutional provision and the injury it is designed to prevent.  In the
Emoluments Clause context, the question of whether a plaintiff has stated a
cause of action under the Clause depends upon what type of harm the Clause
is designed to avoid.  With respect to the purpose of the Clause, the CREW
district court found that
291 See In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 377 (4th Cir.) (“When plaintiffs before a court are
unable to specify the relief they seek, one must wonder why they came to the court for
relief in the first place.”), reh’g en banc granted, 780 F. App’x 36 (4th Cir. 2019).
292 Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 939 F.3d at 148 (alteration in original)
(citations omitted) (quoting In re Trump, 928 F.3d at 377).
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[T]here can be no doubt that the intended purpose of the Foreign Emolu-
ments Clause was to prevent official corruption and foreign influence . . . .
[Therefore] [t]here is simply no basis to conclude that the Hospitality Plain-
tiffs’ alleged competitive injury falls within the zone of interests that the
Emoluments Clauses sought to protect.293
  Yet there are several reasons why the zone-of-interests test itself is not help-
ful in the Emoluments Clause context.  First, the Supreme Court has made
clear that a zone-of-interests inquiry is not a question of Article III stand-
ing.294  Rather, as described above, the zone-of-interests inquiry is about
whether plaintiff has stated a cause of action under the relevant law.295  This
is perhaps a trivial distinction insofar as plaintiffs must succeed in stating a
cause of action to proceed with their case, but it is a significant distinction in
that the failure to state a cause of action does not deprive the court of juris-
diction over the case.  Looking at the zone of interests, however, requires
paying attention to the harm the Clause is designed to avoid.
In employing the zone-of-interests framework, the CREW district court
was seeking to vindicate the sensible intuition that the CREW plaintiffs were
not describing the right kind of injury.  Surely, the CREW district court pre-
sumed, in drafting the emoluments prohibitions the Framers did not intend
to protect busboys’ tips.296  In this way, the CREW district court begins to ask
the right question: What is the purpose or benefit of the Emoluments
Clause?  However, the CREW district court fails to take the question to its
natural and logical terminus: If the Emoluments Clause is designed to pro-
tect all of the people from a corrupted President, how can the injury that
follows from that harm ever be concrete or particular?  By borrowing the
zone-of-interests test from its ordinary home in statutory construction, the
CREW district court begins down a fruitful path, but unfortunately aborts the
mission prematurely.
Moreover, applying the zone-of-interests framework in the constitutional
context—particularly, as here, in the context of a clause that directs its bene-
fit to all of the people at the same time and in the same way—while simultaneously
applying the CAP rule constitutes the worst of both worlds.  Applying both the
statutory zone-of-interests test while also applying the CAP rule (which neces-
sitates the use of token plaintiffs) essentially ensures that no plaintiff can
satisfy standing in the emoluments context.  Because token plaintiffs, by defi-
nition, suffer collateral rather than primary constitutional injuries, token
plaintiffs will necessarily fail the zone-of-interest test.  The only way to avoid
this outcome is to, in effect, expand the “zone” such that any injury fairly
traceable to a violation of the Clause falls within the zone.  At that point, it is
not clear that the “zone” analysis is doing any work whatsoever.
293 Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 188
(S.D.N.Y. 2017), vacated and remanded, 939 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2019).
294 Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 939 F.3d at 154.
295 See supra notes 289–90 and accompanying text.
296 See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 276 F. Supp. 3d at 187.
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The Second Circuit, when faced with the zone-of-interests and CAP
dilemma employed an “expand the zone” approach to reconcile the difficul-
ties presented by the conjunction of the two standards.  The Second Circuit
stated that the CREW district court misapplied the test, and that in fact:
[T]he zone of interests test does not require the plaintiff to be an intended
beneficiary of the law in question.  Plaintiffs who are injured by the defen-
dant’s alleged violation of a limiting law may sue to enforce the limitation
under the longstanding zone of interests test the Court has articulated.297
  However, the Second Circuit’s “expand the zone” approach does nothing
to alleviate the concern that in the absence of some kind of “zone” rule (i.e.,
a rule tethering standing to the purpose of the Emoluments Clause) the CAP
rule necessitates token plaintiffs with trivial injuries that are utterly unrelated
to the important constitutional values at issue in the Clause.  So while the
Second Circuit approach is to only focus on the technical application of the
CAP rule, this approach remains unsatisfying for the reasons discussed above
and demonstrated by the outcomes in Parratt v. Taylor and Armstrong v. Village
of Pinehurst.
In truth, the zone-of-interests test (while a step in the right direction in
terms of focus on the harm prevented) is of limited utility in the constitu-
tional context.  The zone-of-interests test is a statutory interpretation device
and it is not especially well suited to serve as a gatekeeper of constitutional
claims.  The Supreme Court has described the zone-of-interests standard as a
test that asks whether “this particular class of persons ha[s] a right to sue
under [a particular] substantive statute.”298  In applying the zone-of-interests
test, the Court determines whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action
under a given statute, based on the Court’s interpretation of that statute.
The zone-of-interests test asks whether a given plaintiff falls into the class of
individuals to whom a statute has directed a benefit.
In this sense, there are obvious parallels between the zone-of-interests
test and the primary/collateral and differentiated/undifferentiated injury
analysis proposed here.  Both ideas are focused on the plaintiff’s connection
to the primary evil that the law would avoid.  However, the zone-of-interests
test (in the statutory context) is meant to apply in conjunction with the CAP
test, meaning that if a plaintiff has stated a cause of action under the statute
(i.e., they fall within the zone of interests) the plaintiff must still have a con-
crete and particularized injury.  A “zone” connotes a broad, imprecisely
defined area into which a plaintiff may fall.  A plaintiff’s injury may lie along
the periphery of the zone and still qualify as within the zone of interests.  The
perimeters of the zone can be constructed (and reconstructed) by the enact-
ing legislative body, or it may be derived by courts based on evidence within
the statutory text.
297 Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 939 F.3d at 158.
298 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 (2014)
(first alteration in original) (quoting Ass’n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.3d 667,
676 (D.C. Cir. 2013 (per curiam)).
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Yet in the constitutional context, this zone-of-interests delineation
becomes muddled.  As discussed in subsection II.B.2, the “zone of interests”
that attends a constitutional promise is bifurcated.  In an important sense, all
of the people fall within the zone of interests with respect to each constitu-
tional promise.  Each constitutional promise is also a character-of-govern-
ment promise made to each of the people.  It would be worse than a legal
fiction to pretend that only some of the people (or only those of the people
who also suffered a monetizable harm) are the intended beneficiaries of con-
stitutional promises.
But more concerning is the fact that a zone-of-interests analysis does not
distinguish between differentiated and undifferentiated benefits and injuries.
As such, a zone-of-interests analysis is overinclusive in the constitutional con-
text.  For example, a zone-of-interests analysis would find that a plaintiff such
as Mr. Armstrong’s sister falls within the zone of interests of the Fourth
Amendment (as a person harmed by an unreasonable seizure) even though
she did not suffer the primary injury.  In the constitutional context, a zone
approach necessitates some additional limiting mechanism—such as the CAP
rule.  But a focus on primary/collateral and differentiated/undifferentiated
provides a better limiting mechanism.  The analysis advanced here has the
capacity to supplant—in the constitutional context—both the CAP rule and
the zone-of-interests metric, replacing both with a single, parsimonious, and
theoretically coherent explanation of how constitutional injuries translate
into standing to sue.
A final determination of Emoluments Clause standing will most likely
rest with the Supreme Court.  Yet the standing rulings in the CREW and MD/
DC cases are instructive in illuminating the disutility of the CAP rule in the
Emoluments Clause context.  The CREW and MD/DC cases underscore that
an application of the CAP rule to the potential emoluments violations would
likely lead to prioritizing collateral and (from a constitutional perspective)
trivial injuries over primary and constitutionally profound injuries.  As we
have seen, the reason for this inversion is fairly traceable to two concerns: (1)
the Court’s pragmatic worry about constitutional litigation flooding the
courts; and (2) the Court’s separation-of-powers worry about policing the
political branches.299  But we have also seen that CAP does an exceedingly
poor job of addressing these concerns in a principled manner.
Under the CAP rule, so-called “generalized grievances” can be brought
by motivated plaintiffs who are able to locate and befriend a collaterally
injured plaintiff.300  Because such suits survive the CAP rule, the Court still
299 See supra Section II.A.
300 This is assuming sufficient causation can be established.  While the district court in
the CREW litigation found causation was lacking, under slightly different facts a collaterally
injured plaintiff could have sustained standing.  For example, within the China-trademark
scenario, a plaintiff that could demonstrate that the grant of the trademark caused it eco-
nomic harm (which is an easier train of causation to allege) could sustain standing within
the CREW court’s analysis. See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 276 F. Supp. at
184–85.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-3\NDL301.txt unknown Seq: 52 28-FEB-20 12:07
1004 notre dame law review [vol. 95:3
has occasion to pass upon the merits of the underlying claims.  Therefore,
the CAP rule does not permit the federal courts to sidestep the thorniest of
separation-of-powers questions.  Indeed, the CAP rule is insensitive to
whether a particular case presents an especially challenging separation-of-
powers problem.  Under the CAP rule, it is a matter of happenstance
whether an especially difficult separation-of-powers case survives to the adju-
dication stage.301
Adoption of a universal primary-injury model of standing in constitu-
tional claim cases would avoid these paradoxes and problems.  An analysis
that is focused on primary injuries (i.e., the character of injury that mirrors
the constitutional promise) ensures that collateral injuries will not be priori-
tized.  It also ensures that token plaintiffs and happenstance will not deter-
mine the fate of constitutional litigation.  Perhaps more significantly, a
primary-injury rule serves as a screening tool that is actually sensitive to the
separation-of-powers concerns that animate the Court’s standing doctrine.
In focusing on primary injuries, the Court would only pass upon the conduct
of coordinate branches when the constitutional promise itself requires it.302
Anchoring the analysis in the constitutional promise avoids the inconsisten-
cies that arise when discrete collateral injuries are permitted to confer stand-
ing.  Moreover, this method of focusing on the constitutional promise itself is
already the Court’s preferred method of determining standing in individual-
rights cases.303  The whole of the doctrine of standing in constitutional cases
would be rendered coherent and parsimonious if the Court were to extend
this intuition across the doctrine.
Yet, there remains a residual obstacle to a unified approach to standing
in constitutional cases: the Court’s articulated belief that undifferentiated
constitutional injuries are “best” resolved through the political process.304  In
diverting broadly shared Constitution-based injuries to the political process,
the Court manifests a preference for “representative constitutionalism”—a
type of institutional competency principle that places greater confidence in
301 The Lujan plaintiffs, for example, could have likely sustained standing had they
simply purchased airline tickets to demonstrate that they had a concrete plan to visit
regions where endangered species were located, or if they had found someone who trav-
eled to those areas regularly who was willing to join their suit. See Lujan v. Defs. Of Wild-
life, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) (explaining that without “concrete plans,” the plaintiffs had
not demonstrated “‘actual or imminent’ injury”).
302 See infra note 420 and accompanying text.
303 See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
304 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474–75 (1982) (“[E]ven when the plaintiff has alleged redressable
injury sufficient to meet the requirements of Art. III, the Court has refrained from adjudi-
cating ‘abstract questions of wide public significance’ which amount to ‘generalized griev-
ances,’ pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative
branches.” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499–500 (1975))).
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the political branches to resolve widespread constitutional injury.305  How-
ever, in the context of the Emoluments Clause, that confidence is misplaced.
A consideration of representative constitutionalism in the emoluments con-
text follows.
III. REPRESENTATIVE VERSUS DIRECT CONSTITUTIONALISM
Through its injury-in-fact requirement, the Supreme Court articulates a
preference for the resolution of undifferentiated injuries through the politi-
cal process, i.e., through representative constitutionalism.306  The principle
of “representative constitutionalism” assumes that separation-of-powers
norms are best enforced through collective action (via elected representa-
tives) rather than individual action (via individual citizens’ lawsuits).307  In
the context of that preference, this Article makes three claims.  The first
claim is that the Court’s preference for representative constitutionalism is
unevenly applied, such that it is difficult to map the Court’s invocation of the
preference along a principled metric.  As a result, any given application of
the preference is vulnerable to the criticism that the CAP rule serves prima-
rily as a bellwether of judicial sensibilities surrounding the merits of the
underlying case.  Thus, to be justifiable, the invocation of the preference in
the emoluments context must be sustained with greater specificity than mere
reference to the CAP rule.
The second claim is that the assumptions that undergird the Court’s
preference for representative constitutionalism do not obtain in the context
of cases in which undifferentiated injuries are the primary constitutional
injury.  Thus, a default preference for representative constitutionalism in
those contexts is misplaced.  The third claim is that a preference for repre-
sentative constitutionalism is especially inappropriate in the context of the
fiduciary injury that attends an Emoluments Clause violation.  Each of these
ideas is explored in greater detail below.
305 See Mark Gabel, Note, Generalized Grievances and Judicial Discretion, 58 HASTINGS L.J.
1331, 1343 (2007) (“Effectively, the justices were saying that these institutional competence
issues provided a policy justification for denying standing to generalized claims . . . .”).
306 See Warth, 422 U.S. at 499–500 (“[W]hen the asserted harm is a ‘generalized griev-
ance’ shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm
alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction. . . . Without such limitations—
closely related to Art. III concerns but essentially matters of judicial self-governance—the
courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public significance even
though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions
and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights.”).
307 See Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 474 (“Thus, this Court has ‘refrain[ed]
from passing upon the constitutionality of an act [of the representative branches] unless
obliged to do so in the proper performance of our judicial function, when the question is
raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it.’” (alterations in original) (quoting
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919))); see also Warth, 422 U.S. at 499–500.
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A. An Inconsistent Preference
The Court’s preference for representative constitutionalism represents
two related intuitions about widespread constitutional injuries.  The first
intuition is a pragmatic concern about the number of constitutional cases
that come before the federal courts.308  The Court has long worried that
allowing generalized grievances to confer standing, even in limited contexts,
would open the “floodgates” and overwhelm the federal courts with cases in
need of resolution.309
The second intuition is about institutional competency.  The Court has
articulated the belief that elected bodies are better able to satisfactorily
resolve widespread constitutional injuries as compared with countermajori-
tarian courts.310  This intuition is premised on the notion that widespread
constitutional injuries are likely to result from coordinate branches of gov-
ernment exercising their core prerogatives, such as the legislative branch
making determinations about the allocation of taxpayer dollars in United
States v. Richardson.311  When coordinate branches exercise their core prerog-
atives, the Court is disinclined to assume a supervisory role of those preroga-
tives in furtherance of separation-of-powers values.312  Each of these
intuitions is considered in turn below.
1. The Floodgate Intuition
The worry that allowing standing in a subset of cases will “open the
floodgates” and overwhelm the judiciary has been handed down from one
complement of Justices to another without rigorous investigation into
whether there is an empirical basis for the concern.313  In the absence of
empirical support for this intuition, there are several reasons to be skeptical
about the import and magnitude of this concern.314
First, as previously discussed, there is reason to be skeptical about the
efficacy of the CAP rule in terms of reducing the overall number of cases in
the federal courts.315  Moreover, in addition to the fact that the CAP rule
likely does little to reduce the overall number of opportunities for federal
courts to judge the behavior of coordinate branches, there is reason to
308 Levy, supra note 130, at 1009.
309 See, e.g., id. at 1008 & n.1.
310 See Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 475 (asserting that generalized grievances
are more “appropriately addressed in the representative branches”).
311 418 U.S. 166, 177–79 (1974).
312 See Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 473–74.
313 See Levy, supra note 130, at 1008 n.1 (noting that a version of the floodgate concern
was raised as early as 1908).  Levy observes that there is little empirical support for the
“floodgate” concerns and concludes that “if claims about increases in litigation are to influ-
ence at least some decisions, the justices need to provide support for those claims—both
for each other and for the public.” Id. at 1075.
314 Id. at 1008–09 (describing the “normative justification” of the floodgate argument
as “highly contested”).
315 See supra Section II.A.
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believe that the opening-the-floodgates worry itself is overblown.316  Not only
is the floodgates argument in support of the CAP rule lacking in empirical
support,317 but it may also be lacking in a clear, germane, and substantive
content when used by various members of the Court.318  For example, Pro-
fessor Marin Levy has observed that “recent cases show the justices vacillating
between providing assurances that their decision will not result in a deluge of
new claims, and accusing each other of being driven by an improper desire
to stave off such a deluge.”319  The floodgate alarm has been used in diverse
and internally inconsistent contexts without the mooring benefit of eviden-
tiary support, such that it has taken on more the character of epithet than of
a serious constitutional obstacle.320  Justice Ginsburg, writing in dissent, has
succinctly summarized this development, stating: “The ‘floodgates’ argument
the Court today embraces has been rehearsed and rejected before.”321
The fact that the floodgate rationale is frequently used to support both
sides of a contested determination by the Court suggests that it may lack a
stable normative content.322  The floodgate rationale is, at heart, a predic-
tion about how future litigants will behave if the Court adopts a new rule.  Yet
the ordinary norms of prediction with their attendant empirical safeguards
seem not to obtain.323  Those invoking the floodgate alarm have not felt
316 See Levy, supra note 130, at 1068–69; see also id. at 1073 (“[T]he Court should be
wary of relying on court-centered floodgates arguments, particularly when outside the pol-
icy-making context.”).
317 See, e.g., W. Justin Jacobs, Note, Help or Hamp(er)?—The Courts’ Reluctance to Provide
the Right to a Private Action Under Hamp and Its Detrimental Effect on Homeowners, 47 VAL. U. L.
REV. 267, 303 (2012) (“[T]he problem with the theory of ‘floodgates’ is that courts cannot
know the actual effects on the judicial system of allowing third party beneficiary
standing . . . .”).
318 Levy, supra note 130, at 1037 n.153 (“Although the Court discusses floodgates in the
context of frivolous cases and in the context of claims more generally, just which concern
is animating the argument in a given opinion is not always clear.”); see also id. at 1077
(arguing that “court-centered floodgates arguments” should not “spill over into the sub-
stantive analysis of law”).
319 Id. at 1009 (footnote omitted).
320 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
430 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[The decision today] opens the door for another
avalanche of new federal cases. . . . This will tend to stultify proper law enforcement and to
make the day’s labor for the honest and conscientious officer even more onerous and
more critical.  Why the Court moves in this direction at this time of our history, I do not
know.”).
321 Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 577 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
322 See Levy, supra note 130, at 1076 (“Though courts and scholars often refer to ‘the
floodgates argument’ as if it had a singular, stable meaning, it can be invoked in various
ways, depending upon who is being flooded, the effect of that flood, and what the flood
contains.”).
323 It should be noted that Justice Scalia, in dissent, did offer some empirical informa-
tion in support of his floodgate argument in the context of habeas petitions in McQuiggin
v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013).  His information indicated that habeas filings had more
than doubled between 1969 and 2012. Id. at 412 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“By 1969, [the
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obliged to supply evidence of past instances in which the federal courts were
in fact “flooded” as the result of similar rule changes, and that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were inadequate to address the “flood.”324  Given
that members of the Court have so frequently predicted a litigatory deluge as
a consequence of a rule change, it would seem a simple matter to confirm
that a deluge has, in fact, occurred.325  However, evidence of past flooding
has yet to emerge within the floodgate discourse.326
It is possible that the reason that the floodgate worry has not been docu-
mented may be because it has yet to come to pass.  There is ample reason to
believe that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are generally commensurate
to the task of qualitatively stemming the tide of litigation.327  The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to weed out duplicative, harassing, friv-
olous, and meritless cases.328  While no standing rule—including the CAP
rule—prevents nonmeritorious cases from being filed in federal court, such
cases are generally resolved on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.329  The
Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is also the first opportunity during which a
defendant can challenge standing.330  There is no strategic advantage to
number of habeas filings] had grown to 7,359.  In the year ending on September 30, 2012,
15,929 such petitions were filed.” (citation omitted)).  However, the prison population also
increased eight-fold during that time period, rendering Scalia’s causal claim (that a rule
change caused a “flood” of new habeas filings) questionable. E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA
GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2012: TRENDS IN ADMISSIONS AND
RELEASES, 1991–2012, at 1 (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p12tar9112.pdf
(total prison population in 2012 was 1,570,400); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS, 1925–85, at 2 (1986), https://www.bjs.gov/con-
tent/pub/pdf/sfp2585.pdf (total prison population in 1969 was 197,136). If anything, the
empirical evidence better supports the claim that the rule change reduced per capita habeas
filing by a factor of four—although, of course, a causal claim cannot be supported in the
absence of a consideration of other variables.
324 See supra note 323.
325 See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
326 See Levy, supra note 130, at 1074 (“[J]ustices often invoke floodgates arguments
without much support for why they believe a large number of cases will come. . . . Forecast-
ing the number of cases that will follow a decision is no easy task and may be near impossi-
ble in some cases.”).
327 See, e.g., Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pleading Require-
ments in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935, 938–39 (1990) (“[C]ourts . . .
utilize procedural mechanisms, particularly in the case of prisoner suits, to screen out mer-
itless actions at the earliest stage of litigation.”).
328 The Court in Flast v. Cohen noted that the standing rule’s quantitative-control ratio-
nale might be unnecessary in light of “modern” civil litigation conditions, which include
the availability of class actions.  Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968).
329 For example, in response to Justice Blackmun’s concern that the decision in Bivens
would cause an “avalanche” of new cases, Justice Brennan observed, “In estimating the
magnitude of any such ‘avalanche,’ it is worth noting that a survey of comparable actions
against state officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 found only 53 reported cases in 17 years . . .
that survived a motion to dismiss.”  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 391 n.4 (1971).
330 See Blaze, supra note 327, at 983–85.
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defendants—in terms of the expenditure of resources—to having a case dis-
missed for want of standing as compared to any other grounds for dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(1).331  Likewise, doctrines and mechanisms designed to
conserve both judicial and defendant resources, such as claim preclusion,
issue preclusion, abstention, joinder, and case consolidation, all operate to
prevent horizonal lawsuits alleging the same nexus of operative facts from
going forward simultaneously in multiple district courts—a point that is espe-
cially important in the emoluments context where presumably any citizen
suit would allege the same operative facts.332
Perhaps more significantly, scholars such as Levy have persuasively ques-
tioned whether it is appropriate for the judiciary to restrict access to courts
based solely on the rationale of conserving its own resources.333  This is par-
ticularly so if the restriction disproportionately burdens low-resource plain-
tiffs as may be the case with the CAP rule.  If the CAP rule precludes
generalized grievances except when a collaterally injured plaintiff can be pro-
duced, then low-resource plaintiffs who lack the capacity to locate and col-
laborate with collaterally injured plaintiffs will not be able to bring cases that
high-resource plaintiffs (who can do the groundwork necessary to scour for
collaterally injured plaintiffs) would be permitted to bring.  In the context of
an emoluments violation, for example, an individual citizen may lack the
resources to locate and enlist Trump competitors (particularly if the competi-
tors are abroad, as in the example of the Chinese trademark).  As a conse-
quence, the generalized-grievance prohibition might serve as a “litigation
tax” or entry barrier to the enforcement of constitutional rights.
Moreover, regardless of whether the floodgate worry is well founded in
other contexts, it has exceedingly little purchase in the context of the rule
change proposed here.  Shifting the standing prescription from a focus on
particularized injuries to a focus on primary injuries will result in an alteration
of standing availability in a very small subset of cases, as is discussed in detail
below in Part IV.  Given the modest effect that adoption of a primary-injury
model of constitutional standing will have on the standing status quo, a flood-
gate concern is unfounded.
331 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (permitting dismissal of cases in which plaintiff has failed
“to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”).
332 For example, FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) provides: “If actions before the court involve a
common question of law or fact, the court may: (1) join for hearing or trial any or all
matters at issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any other orders to
avoid unnecessary cost or delay.”  Ironically, the Court’s CAP rule currently precludes pro-
cedural mechanisms like consolidation in the three pending emoluments suits, since each
suit advances a novel theory of standing which must be individually resolved and appealed
before the courts can reach the merits.  If the standing issue were removed, the three cases
could be consolidated.
333 See Levy, supra note 130, at 1076–77 (arguing that floodgate arguments that are
centered on conserving the courts’ own resources by manipulation of substantive law “raise
serious concerns,” and that “[s]hort of a catastrophic situation, anxieties about caseload
would do well to be addressed through Congress and the lower courts’ case-management
tools”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-3\NDL301.txt unknown Seq: 58 28-FEB-20 12:07
1010 notre dame law review [vol. 95:3
2. The Institutional Competence Intuition
In addition to assuming that the CAP rule reduces the overall number of
cases, the Supreme Court has relied on the CAP rule to qualitatively screen
cases along a separation-of-powers metric.334  The Court has presumed a
qualitative connection between “generalized grievances” and cases that are
better resolved by the political branches.335  The precise character of this
connection is not clear, but it is safe to infer that the connection the Court
presumes has to do with the intuition that undifferentiated injuries are more
(or most) often the result of the political branches of government exercising
their discretionary core functions.336  In Richardson, for example, the plain-
tiff’s alleged injury involved discretionary decisions made about the alloca-
tion of taxpayer money.337  The Court seems to understand the
“particularized” rule to preclude cases that would require it to traverse diffi-
cult separation-of-powers terrain by eliminating the class of cases that impli-
cate core functions of coordinate branches.338
However, even assuming arguendo that a connection exists between
undifferentiated injuries and the exercise of political branches’ core func-
tions (and there is considerable reason to be skeptical about such a connec-
tion),339 the CAP rule is remarkably poorly suited to serve these functions.
The CAP rule is both overinclusive and underinclusive with respect to elimi-
nating opportunities for the Court to pass upon the core functions of coordi-
nate branches.340  The CAP rule is underinclusive in that it often allows cases
that advance undifferentiated harms to go forward when they are sufficiently
coupled with collateral differentiated harms.341  This is illustrated by the CAP
334 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474–75 (1982) (noting that generalized grievances are prohibited
because they are more appropriately resolved by the “representative branches”).
335 See id.
336 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499–500 (1975) (positing that the political
branches are more competent to resolve generalized grievances); Valley Forge Christian Coll.,
454 U.S. at 474–75 (stating that generalized grievances are more “appropriately addressed
in the representative branches”).
337 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974).
338 Id. at 179.
339 See Elliott, supra note 13, at 512–14.
340 See Hessick, supra note 116, at 675 (arguing that standing law is “overbroad” in that
it fails to be sensitive to whether a particular case actually implicates separation-of-powers
concerns).
341 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 757 (D. Md. 2018)
(finding that Maryland and the District of Columbia have standing to raise an emoluments
challenge), rev’d and remanded, In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 374–79 (4th Cir.), reh’g en banc
granted, 780 F. App’x 36 (4th Cir. 2019).  If Maryland and the District of Columbia are able
to advance to the merits of their case, the Court will pass upon questions that implicate not
just the alleged injury to the plaintiffs at bar, but also the “generalized grievance” that each
of “the People” share in a case of an alleged violation of a President’s duty of loyalty.
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rule’s uneven application in CREW and MD/DC cases.342  The Second Circuit
has found that the collateral injuries of the plaintiffs were sufficiently causally
connected to the alleged presidential disloyalty to sustain and the Fourth
Circuit will review that issue en banc.343  If either the CREW or MD/DC case
proceeds through all of the stages of appeal, the Supreme Court will have an
opportunity to resolve the substantive questions of the case, regardless of the
fact that the primary injury that attends the alleged emoluments violation has
to do with presidential disloyalty.  So, depending on the availability of collat-
erally injured plaintiffs, the CAP rule does not prevent the federal courts
from resolving a case in which the primary injury is an undifferentiated
injury.  The Court frequently resolves those claims nonetheless, depending
on the availability of collaterally injured plaintiffs.
It is also important to be clear that the Court is categorically selective in
its preference to avoid a supervisory role when confronted with coordinate
branches’ core prerogatives.  In many constitutional contexts, the Court is
comfortable passing upon the core discretionary determinations of coordi-
nate branches of government.  Determining whether an executive action
intrudes upon legislative prerogative344 or determining whether a piece of
legislation exceeds the power of Congress345 is, after all, the core function of
the federal judiciary.  The Court is willing to engage with those questions, in
many constitutional contexts, even when it is asked to define the content of
constitutional promises that affect all of the people indiscriminately.346  In
the context of  individual-rights cases, for example, courts do not rely upon
the CAP standard to safeguard separation-of-powers values, even though in
the context of individual rights courts are routinely called upon to pass upon
the often highly politicized behavior of coordinate branches of govern-
ment.347  The Court has also evidenced a willingness to pass upon constitu-
tionality of the actions of sovereign states in the context of deeply contested
constitutional questions about which reasonable minds disagree.348  It is not
clear why separation-of-powers concerns are not equally implicated in cases
342 Id. at 738–53 (finding standing); Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v.
Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 183–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (not finding standing), vacated and
remanded, 939 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2019).
343 Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 939 F.3d at 142–58; In re Trump, 928 F.3d
at 374–80.
344 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998) (holding that Line
Item Veto Act of 1996 violated the Presentment Clause).
345 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding that the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded Congress’ power to legislate under the Com-
merce Clause).
346 See, e.g., Mueller v Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390–91 (1983) (finding that tax deduction
for parochial school tuition did not violate the Establishment Clause).
347 See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556, 559–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(proceeding to the merits on a Fourth Amendment challenge to New York City’s highly
controversial “stop-and-frisk” policy).
348 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that the
District of Columbia’s handgun prohibition violated the Second Amendment).
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that require the Court to pass upon coordinate branches’ core prerogatives
by plaintiffs who happen to have suffered a differentiated rather than undif-
ferentiated injury.  If the concern is the Court’s substantive supervision of
core functions, it is not clear why this concern would be mitigated based on
the degree of specificity of the plaintiff’s injury.
So, the Court’s intuition that the exercise of core prerogatives by repre-
sentative bodies should be resolved through the electoral process is not abso-
lute, and it certainly does not obtain in all cases.  Moreover, in relying upon
the exceedingly ill-suited CAP rule to insulate it from this subset of cases the
Court is likely doing more harm than good.  Indeed, Professor Heather Elli-
ott has persuasively made the point that not only is our current standing
doctrine not an essential element of separation-of-powers, the doctrine itself
often serves to undermine separation-of-powers values.349  Professor Elliott
observes:
[T]here is no single “idea of separation of powers,” but instead at least
three—the concrete-adversity function, the pro-democracy function, and the
anticonscription function—and each of these is contested.  Arguably
because of these submerged disagreements, standing performs these func-
tions poorly.  Standing is not particularly good at ensuring concrete adver-
sity, gives incoherent and sometimes antidemocratic guidance on promoting
democracy, and utterly fails at preventing Congress from conscripting the
courts to ensure that the executive branch does its job.350
These doctrinal inadequacies prompt “repeated accusations of manipulation
and illegitimacy,” which ultimately damage the judiciary itself.351  To address
this crisis of legitimacy, Professor Elliott urges radical change, arguing that
“the doctrine in its current form should be discarded.”352
As a final point, as with the floodgate worry, the institutional-compe-
tency worry has especially little purchase in the context of the rule change
that is proposed here.  Shifting the focus to primary injuries has the ancillary
benefit of causing the Court to engage directly with the content of constitu-
tional promises, rather than the collateral consequences of their violation.
This focus will eliminate the CAP rule’s propensity to allow cases to proceed
based on collateral harms that are not fairly within the contemplation of the
constitutional promise.  Instead, a primary-injury model would only call upon
the judiciary to consider coordinate branches’ discretionary core functions
when the constitutional promise itself (rather than happenstance) requires
it.
By the same token, the rule change proposed here would allow some
cases to proceed that might (depending on the availability of collaterally
injured plaintiffs) have been blocked by the CAP rule.353  Yet there is no
reason to suspect that those cases would especially or particularly implicate
349 Elliott, supra note 13, at 500.
350 Id.
351 Id. at 501.
352 Id. at 508.
353 See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997); infra Part IV.
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separation-of-powers concerns.  More importantly, there is no need to use
the vague and poorly tailored proxy of “generalized grievance” to safeguard
separation-of-powers values in those cases,354 as other, better tools are availa-
ble to serve that purpose.
B. The People’s Provisions
Having explored the Court’s two primary assumptions about the connec-
tion between “generalized grievances” and separation-of-powers values—(1)
that allowing generalized grievances to confer standing will create too many
cases, and (2) that generalized grievances are more likely to implicate separa-
tion-of-powers concerns—we can turn now to consider these assumptions in
the specific context of the rule change proposed here.  This Article proposes
focusing on primary injuries instead of particularized injuries across constitu-
tional contexts.  This change would bring the doctrine of standing in consti-
tutional cases into uniformity with the Court’s existing (if tacit) approach in
individual-rights cases.355  To understand how this change would operate
across constitutional contexts, it is helpful to first consider what the injury-
specificity continuum can teach us about broad categories of constitutional
provisions and their potential attendant injuries.
For example, looking through the lens of injury-specificity continuum,
we can draw three conclusions in the context of individual rights.  First, viola-
tions of individual rights always produce both differentiated and undifferen-
tiated injuries.  Second, the primary injury that follows a violation of an
individual right is always differentiated.356  Third, the Supreme Court has
long tacitly acknowledged that a primary versus collateral inquiry is the more
salient inquiry in the context of individual rights.357
We can now use this quadrangle analysis (differentiated versus undiffer-
entiated and primary versus collateral) to better understand other categories
of constitutional injuries.  Adopting a quadrangle analysis, we see that other
broad categories emerge.  For example, there are many constitutional provi-
sions of which the violation would seem to impose primary, differentiated
harms on collective political bodies or institutions, such as Congress or the
President.  We might regard these provisions (from the harm-continuum per-
spective we are pursuing) as “political-entity” provisions.  The primary harm
that follows from a violation of a political-entity provision is a differentiated
harm.358  For example, if the House of Representatives were to adjourn for
more than three days without the consent of the Senate in violation of the
354 See Hessick, supra note 116, at 675.
355 See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138–39 (1978); supra subsections II.B.1–2.
356 See discussion supra subsection II.B.1.
357 See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 138–39.
358 This primary, differentiated harm could just impact a political entity or it could
impact one or more citizens and a political entity.  However, the primary harm is not an
undifferentiated harm, and so the primary harm would not impact all of “the People” in
the same way.
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Adjournment Clause,359 the primary injury is likely a differentiated injury
suffered by the Senate, with a collateral undifferentiated character-of-govern-
ment injury to the rest of us.
In all instances, the violation of a political-entity provision produces pri-
mary, differentiated harms that impact some political entity.  When a politi-
cal-entity clause is violated, some political entity (i.e., the Senate in the
example of the Adjournment Clause) has been deprived of its constitution-
ally committed power or role.  The violation of a political-entity provision
also always produces some undifferentiated harms.  Minimally, the violation
of a political-entity provision produces a character-of-government injury (as
all constitutional violations do), but the primary injury that follows from the
violation of a political-entity provision is a differentiated injury.
Consider, for example, the difficult case of the “Advice and Consent”
language in the Appointments Clause.360  The “Advice and Consent” lan-
guage of the Appointments Clause makes a promise, but it is not obvious to
whom the promise is made or what character-of-government injury is a mir-
ror of that promise.  This is because the Court has yet to address antecedent
questions about the content of the promises made by the Appointments
Clause.361  Does the Appointments Clause promise the President that the
Senate will formally consider a presidential nominee?  Assuming arguendo
that the Appointments Clause makes such a promise, what is the primary
injury that follows from a breach of that promise?  On one view, a differenti-
ated injury would seem to fall upon the President who was denied her role in
the constitutional scheme.362  Moreover, that differentiated injury might be
the primary injury—it might mirror the constitutional promise.  Although a
character-of-government injury would undoubtedly follow as well, it may be
that the more salient promises made by the “Advice and Consent” language
are made primarily to the President and the Senate, that each will have a role
to play in the appointment process.  Although the people are clearly the
third-party beneficiary of these (and all) constitutional guarantees, the
“Advice and Consent” language is not a promise to the people that the peo-
ple themselves may appoint a Justice, or that the people themselves may vote
on one.  This is one way to identify the primary and collateral injuries in this
context.
359 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (“Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall,
without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place
than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.”).
360 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
361 Scholars have addressed some of these antecedent questions, arriving at various
conclusions. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Putting Presidential Performance in the Federal
Appointments Process in Perspective, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1359, 1360 (1997) (arguing in
favor of a more limited role for the Senate in the appointments process); David A. Strauss
& Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J.
1491, 1493 (1992) (arguing that the Senate is not required to defer to presidential prefer-
ences in appointments).
362 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[W]ith the Advice and Consent of the Senate, [the
President] shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court . . . .”).
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However, a second way to analyze this language is to ask whether the
primary benefit of the “Advice and Consent” language inures to the Senate
and President or to the people who are represented by the Senate and Presi-
dent.  If either the Senate or the President were to fail to uphold their consti-
tutionally defined duties under the Appointments Clause, we might be
tempted to conclude that the graver injury falls upon the people—after all,
the Senate and the President are each acting on behalf of the people.  Ulti-
mately, as a result of the alleged violation, the people are potentially
deprived of the benefit of the seating of a Supreme Court Justice nominated
by the President whom they elected.
Here, however, it is instructive to arrive at the primary injury by identify-
ing the protection the Constitution supplies.  If all the relevant parties
behaved as the Clause requires, there is no reason to believe the President’s
nominee would be appointed.  That is not the Appointment Clause’s prom-
ise.363  The Constitution promises a process, not an outcome.  It promises
that the Senate will have a role to play, not that the Senate will do a good job
executing its constitutionally committed role.364  The Senate could consider
and vote down every nominee put forward by a sitting President, and the
formal requirements of the “Advice and Consent” language would presuma-
bly be met.365  In that scenario, the proposed injury to the people (i.e., the
absence of the elected President’s nominee on the Court) would be identi-
cal, but there would be no constitutional violation.  Thus, in this context,
even though the character-of-government harm is quite grave, it is not the
primary harm.  The constitutional promise is a process promise and its mirror
is a process injury: the injury befalls the President whose nominee is not
considered.366
Compare this scenario with an Emoluments Clause violation.  The Emol-
uments Clause367 also contemplates a role for Congress in the safeguarding
of federal officer loyalty.  A federal officer may accept an emolument if Con-
gress consents.368  Thus, we may be tempted to imagine that the injury that
mirrors the Emoluments Clause’s promise of loyalty inures to the Congress
that is empowered to authorize an emolument.
However, here, again, it is instructive to arrive at the primary harm of an
emoluments violation by identifying the protection that it supplies.  Keeping
emoluments out of the hands of federal officers is not the benefit of the
Clause.  The benefit of the Clause is keeping secret emoluments out of the
hands of federal officers.  The benefit is preventing the kind of insidious
363 See id.
364 This does not, of course, preclude standing by a President who was promised the
power to appoint.
365 Strauss & Sustein, supra note 361, at 1491–94 (arguing that the Senate is not
required by the Constitution to defer to the President on Supreme Court nominations).
366 This is assuming that the content of the Appointments Clause promise guarantees
the President formal consideration of his or her nominee, which it may not.
367 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
368 See id.
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treachery that comes of having an undeclared indebtedness to a foreign head
of state.  If the constitutional mandate is followed, then the people are pro-
tected from that harm—whether Congress approves the emolument or not.
In this light, the benefit to the people does not depend on the behavior of
Congress.  Congress could authorize even the most outrageous foreign emol-
uments and the benefit to the people would be left undisturbed.  Congress’s
role is ancillary to the central promise of the Clause, which is to prohibit
secret disloyalty.
Hence, the central promise of the Emoluments Clause is not a promise
to Congress that it can pick and choose among acceptable emoluments.  The
emoluments promise is not a process promise; it is an outcome promise: that
we will be protected from the danger that results from our federal officers
forging secret alliances with foreign states.  Congress has a constitutionally
committed role to play in the emoluments context, and a differentiated
injury follows when Congress is denied that role.369  However, the injury that
Congress suffers is collateral to the primary harm that follows from an emolu-
ments violation: the harm of a disloyal federal officer.  Thus, because the
primary harm of a violation of the Emoluments Clause is not the differenti-
ated injury suffered by Congress, the Emoluments Clause is not a “political-
entity” provision.
We can now identify two categories of constitutional provisions: (1) indi-
vidual-rights provisions in which the primary injury is always differentiated;
and (2) political-entity provisions in which the primary injury is always differ-
entiated.370  Individual-rights provisions and political-entity provisions
together constitute most of the Constitution.  There is, however, another,
third, broad category of constitutional provision within this framework.
There is a category of constitutional provisions for which undifferentiated
harms are the only possible primary harms.  We might think of these as “peo-
ple’s provisions” because all of the people are the direct (rather than third-
party) beneficiaries of the constitutional promise.371
The Emoluments Clause is an example of a people’s provision.  The
Emoluments Clause confers a single, undifferentiated benefit: that we will
have a government in which our federal officers are not vulnerable to foreign
influence.372  Unlike individual-rights or political-entity provisions, the
Clause makes no promise more specific than the promise about the kind of
government we will have (i.e., loyal).
369 See EISEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 7.
370 While it is helpful within this analysis to consider categories of constitutional provi-
sions in light of the injuries they produce, this is not intended to be an exhaustive list of all
possible categories.  For example, there are some provisions, the violation of which would
seem to produce differentiated injuries to groups of people, and as such do not fit neatly
within the “individual-rights provision” category.
371 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978) (observing that the question of standing
depends upon “whether the proponent is asserting his own legal rights and interests rather
than basing his claim for relief upon the rights of third parties”).
372 Or at least we will not have a federal officer who is vulnerable to foreign influence
because she accepted a secret bribe from a foreign regime.
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Unlike injuries to individual rights, which fall disproportionately on the
person who is personally experiencing the illegal conduct, an emoluments
injury falls upon all of the people in exactly the same way, with the same
severity, and at the same time.  When the Emoluments Clause is observed, no
person or entity is particularly or uniquely benefited by having a loyal govern-
ment, and when it is violated, no person or entity uniquely bears the risk of a
disloyal government.  When the Emoluments Clause is violated, the primary
harm is always undifferentiated.  Any differentiated harm that may coincide
with the violation is a collateral harm.
It is worth noting that people’s provisions seem to constitute a very small
subset of constitutional provisions.  While a comprehensive taxonomy of
potential people’s provisions exceeds the scope of this project (and would
require considerable attention to magnitudes of heretofore unaddressed
antecedent questions about the content of various constitutional promises)
the contours of the concept of a “people’s provision” may be made better
illuminated in the context of a more familiar people’s provision: the Estab-
lishment Clause.373  A consideration of the Establishment Clause as a peo-
ple’s provision follows.
1. The Establishment Clause as a People’s Provision
The Establishment Clause poses a perennial challenge to standing doc-
trine in general and to the CAP rule in particular.374  Like the Emoluments
Clause, the Establishment Clause protects against a specific harm that the
framers understood to be an existential threat to the United States: the impo-
sition of a state religion.  The Clause states that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion.”375  It is a promise that there will be
no official religion in the United States.376  As such, it is a character-of-gov-
ernment promise.  Importantly, it is only a character-of-government promise.
Consequently, the primary injury that attends an establishment violation is
always undifferentiated.  Unlike an unreasonable seizure, which affects one
person at a time, an Establishment Clause violation affects all of the people
simultaneously in exactly the same way.  In this way, the Establishment Clause
is a people’s provision.
373 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion. . . .).
374 See William P. Marshall & Gene R. Nichol, Not A Winn-Win: Misconstruing Standing
and the Establishment Clause, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 215, 215  (“In no line of cases over the past
half-century has the Supreme Court so directly faced the tension between constitutional
accountability and jurisdictional traditions of personal harm as in the taxpayer standing
decisions under the Establishment Clause.”).
375 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
376 See generally Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establish-
ment Clause, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 675 (2002) (“[T]he Establishment Clause was born, like
many other elements of the Bill of Rights, out of a desire to protect the individual from
coercion at the hands of the state.”).
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The fact that the primary harm that follows from an Establishment
Clause violation is always an undifferentiated harm has placed it in a unique
posture within the Court’s larger standing doctrine.377  An Establishment
Clause violation often assumes the form of a governmental endorsement of
religion (as with a public display of religious material), or a governmental
sponsoring (as with financial support) of religion.378  In the governmental
endorsement cases, the Supreme Court has generally declined to apply the
CAP rule.379  It has, in fact, generally declined to interrogate standing at all,
simply omitting it—without explanation—from the Court’s analysis.380  In
these cases, the Court has proceeded to the merits of the case as though
standing is categorically not an issue in the governmental endorsement
context.381
In the context of governmental sponsorship cases, the Court has
expressly rejected the CAP rule.  In 1968, in Flast v. Cohen, the Court carved
out an Establishment Clause exception to its longstanding prohibition of tax-
payer standing, holding that a plaintiff’s status as a taxpayer is sufficient to
challenge governmental expenditures in support of religion.382  In more
recent cases, the Court has seemed inclined to narrow this singularly broad
grant of standing in the governmental sponsorship context, but the Court
has understandably struggled to articulate what a concrete and particularized
injury is in context of objecting to state sponsorship of religion.383  Attempts
to apply the CAP rule only serve to underscore the fact that the primary harm
imposed by a violation is essentially a “generalized grievance”—a grievance
shared equally by all the people.  Injuries that might be described as “direct”
or “tangible” are also patently collateral to the injury the Clause promises to
prevent.
377 See Carl H. Esbeck, Why the Supreme Court Has Fashioned Rules of Standing Unique to the
Establishment Clause, ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS, Oct. 2009, at 134, 134
(2009) (“For over half a century . . . the Supreme Court has reduced the rigor of its stand-
ing rules when a claim is lodged under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.”).
378 Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (“In the absence of precisely
stated constitutional prohibitions, we must draw lines with reference to the three main evils
against which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection: ‘sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.’” (quoting
Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970))).
379 But see Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485–86 (1982) (stating that mere belief that government action violates
the Establishment Clause is insufficient to confer standing).
380 Marshall & Nichol, supra note 374, at 215 (“[At] times, the Court has sidestepped
the standing question and proceeded directly to the merits of the Establishment Clause
claim, apparently assuming, without explanation, the existence of standing.”).
381 See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 391–93 (1983).
382 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105–06 (1968); see also Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org.
v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 143–44 (2011) (holding that the Flast exception does not apply in
the context of a tax credit as opposed to a tax expenditure).
383 Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org., 563 U.S. at 143–45.
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We might, for example, be tempted to imagine that the Establishment
Clause violation could impose differentiated harm based on factors like relig-
ious affiliation or atheism.  If the state-sponsored religion were Roman
Catholicism, for example, we might imagine that all non-Catholic religious
people, atheists, and Catholics who do not want a state-sponsored religion
would suffer an injury that is differentiated from the injury suffered by
Catholics who do want a state-sponsored religion.  But to understand the
promise of the Establishment Clause this way is to understand its promise to
be that there will be no state-sponsored religion unless everyone is in favor of it.
Instead, the Establishment Clause promises that the character of American
government will not change in this very specific way.  The change in charac-
ter is the injury.
Further, the change in character is the primary injury.  Imagine, for
example, that my town violated the Clause by placing the Ten Command-
ments on the courthouse lawn, resulting in large protests, and that the pro-
tests caused my nearby business to lose money.384  Although I would have
suffered a differentiated harm, that harm is clearly collateral to the harm that
follows from the state’s endorsing religion.  It is the endorsement of religion
(rather than the reduction of my profits) that the Establishment Clause
promises to prevent.
The Court’s inclination to broadly recognize standing in the Establish-
ment Clause context suggests that its sensibilities in this area are consistent
with a primary-injury model of Establishment Clause standing.385  This incli-
nation could be transformed into an internally consistent doctrine with the
uniform adoption of a primary-injury model of standing across constitutional
contexts.  In that scenario, standing to enforce people’s provisions, like the
Establishment Clause or the Emoluments Clause, would resemble qui tam
standing: any one of the people could challenge an alleged governmental
endorsement or governmental sponsorship of religion on behalf of all of the
people.386
Further, like qui tam standing in other contexts, plaintiffs who sue to
enforce people’s provisions (i.e., constitutional provisions in which the pri-
mary harm is undifferentiated) such as the Establishment Clause or the
Emoluments Clause would serve as catalysts for the articulation and enforce-
ment of constitutional values that might otherwise go unarticulated and
unenforced.  Allowing citizen suits to function as public attorneys general is
384 See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 851, 881 (2005) (display of
the Ten Commandments at a county courthouse violated the Establishment Clause).
385 See Marshall & Nichol, supra note 374, at 215 (“Sometimes, most notably in Flast v
Cohen, the Justices have explicitly embraced a broad understanding of standing to sue.”
(footnote omitted)).
386 The phrase “qui tam” is short for “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte
sequitur,” which translates to “he who brings an action for the king as well as for himself.”
Here, I employ the term to convey a plaintiff who brings an action on behalf of herself and
all of the people. Cf. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765,
773–74 (2000) (holding that the False Claims Act permits a plaintiff to bring an Article III
civil action to remedy an injury in fact suffered by the United States as a whole).
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especially compelling in the context of people’s provisions like the Establish-
ment Clause or the Emoluments Clause, which are addressed to existential
threats to the integrity of the United States.  People’s provisions inevitably
involve high-stakes issues about the very character of the government itself.
In this light, erring on the side of too broad a grant of standing is preferable
to precluding altogether the private enforcement of these important consti-
tutional norms.
Qui tam standing here would also mean embracing direct constitutional-
ism over representative constitutionalism in the narrow context of people’s
provisions.  A consideration of the relative merits of direct constitutionalism
in the context of people’s provisions follows.
2. Standing and People’s Provisions
When the primary injury that follows from the violation of a constitu-
tional provision is undifferentiated—as with people’s provisions like the
Establishment Clause and the Emoluments Clause—the Court is presented
with three standing options.  The first option is to recognize broad, qui
tam–like standing based on a primary-injury model of constitutional stand-
ing.  The second option is to not allow private enforcement of the provision
at all and to instead rely entirely on representative constitutionalism (e.g.,
action by Congress) to enforce the provision.  The third option is to apply
the CAP rule and allow collateral injuries to fitfully confer standing to plain-
tiffs as a means of allowing some (ostensibly quantitatively limited) private
enforcement of the provision.
In the context of the Establishment Clause, the Court has historically
been inclined toward the first option—a broad conferral of standing.387  The
Establishment Clause also provides a vantage point from which to view the
limitations of the second and third options in the specific context of a peo-
ple’s provision.  Relying entirely on representative bodies to enforce the lib-
erty-of-conscience norms embedded in the Establishment Clause places too
much trust in the political process, particularly in light of the seriousness of
the underlying liberty interest.388  Also, given that the Establishment Clause
explicitly identifies Congress as a potential threat to the particular liberty
interest at issue,389 relying entirely on Congress (or other political bodies or
entities) to enforce the Clause could turn out to be a bit like asking the cat to
guard the canary.
Of the three standing options available to the Court in the context of a
people’s provision, the third option—applying the CAP rule and allowing
collateral harms to unevenly confer standing—is perhaps the least satisfying.
Allowing collaterally injured plaintiffs to exclusively enforce a people’s provi-
sion leads to inconsistent and unjustifiable inclusion and exclusion criteria.
387 Esbeck, supra note 377, at 134.
388 See Feldman, supra note 376, at 675 (“[T]he Framers . . . intended the Establish-
ment Clause to protect the liberty of conscience of religious dissenters . . . .”).
389 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Moreover, application of the CAP rule in this context necessarily means that
only collaterally injured plaintiffs can enforce the Clause because any differ-
entiated harms are necessarily collateral.  This unsatisfactory result is likely
why the Court has largely abstained from applying the CAP rule in the Estab-
lishment Clause context.
These three options will also be before the Court when it eventually
turns to the novel question of Emoluments Clause standing.  In that context,
the Court could adopt a primary-injury model of constitutional standing (as
advanced here) and, following its lead in the Establishment Clause context,
allow for a broad grant of qui tam–type standing to enforce the fiduciary duty
embodied in the Emoluments Clause.
Alternatively, the Court could apply the CAP rule and allow collateral
harms (such as loss of tips) to confer standing to challenge the alleged disloy-
alty of a sitting President.  The district courts that have passed upon the
pending emoluments challenges have presumed that the CAP rule is the
appropriate rule in this novel context and have each applied it to similar facts
with disparate results.390  Should the Supreme Court adopt the CAP rule in
the context of emoluments standing, the availability of standing would turn
on the Court’s view of how causally attenuated a plaintiff’s collateral damages
are permitted to be to sustain standing.391  The considerable flexibility inher-
ent in this assessment will render whatever decision the Court should make
vulnerable to criticism that the decision is unprincipled and politicized.
On the other hand, the Court might revive its “generalized-grievance”
rhetoric and, departing from its Establishment Clause precedent, determine
that the best method of enforcing the fiduciary duty embodied in the Emolu-
ments Clause is to abstain from addressing the constitutional question and
instead entrust the resolution of the constitutional question to representative
constitutionalism.
However, representative constitutionalism is especially poorly suited to
safeguard the kind of broad-based character-of-government constitutional
norms that are necessarily at issue when a people’s provision has been vio-
lated.392  That is not say that representative constitutionalism has no role to
play in the development of constitutional norms.  Judicial abstention in favor
of representative constitutionalism makes the most sense when the constitu-
tional conflict at issue involves the exercise of discretionary powers of coordi-
390 District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 737–48 (D. Md. 2018) (finding
standing), rev’d and remanded, In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360 (4th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted,
780 F. App’x 36 (4th Cir. 2019); Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276
F. Supp. 3d 174, 184, 188–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (finding no standing), vacated and remanded,
939 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2019).
391 Cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757–61 (1984) (finding that plaintiffs’ alleged
injury was insufficiently causally connected to the alleged constitutional violation).
392 Endowing the representative bodies with concurrent standing to enforce the Emolu-
ments Clause may be perfectly acceptable.  Given the high stakes at issue when the possibil-
ity of federal officer disloyalty lurks, we would ordinary expect the fullest possible panoply
of enforcement avenues to be made available.
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nate branches of government—as in the Richardson taxpayer case.393  When
discretionary spending, for example, only tangentially implicates constitu-
tional norms, and any rubric of assessing that spending is highly malleable,
then representative constitutionalism is a sensible choice.  In that context,
when all adjudicatory metrics are equally unsatisfactory, it may make sense to
abstain and allow coordinate branches to exercise their discretionary func-
tions without an unprincipled mediation from the judiciary.
However, the constitutional questions that arise in the context of peo-
ple’s provisions like the Emoluments Clause do not center upon the discre-
tionary functions of coordinate branches.  Instead, emoluments controversies
center on questions about the character of the government itself—questions,
for example, about the boundaries of government endorsement of religion
or the scope of an officer’s duty of loyalty to the people.394  Given the con-
tent of these specific questions, there is no reason to believe that representa-
tive bodies are especially competent to address them or that judicial
abstention in this specific context would support separation-of-powers values.
In fact, in the context of enforcing people’s provisions, direct constitutional-
ism is the better mechanism for safeguarding separation-of-powers values.
These ideas are further explored below.
3. The Role of the People in Enforcing the People’s Provisions
The fact that the Emolument Clause is silent on the matter of enforce-
ment does not preclude the possibility that collective action (e.g., an
impeachment action) is a perfectly plausible mechanism for enforcement of
the Clause.395  The question is, however, whether there is justification for the
understanding that impeachment is the only permissible mechanism for
enforcing the Emoluments Clause.  Ordinarily we would assume that consti-
tutional silence should suggest that all the conventional mechanisms for con-
stitutional enforcement are available, including both impeachment and
individual citizen suits.  Yet some commentators have assumed that if action
were taken against a sitting President under the Emoluments Clause, that
action would necessarily take the form of an impeachment proceeding initi-
ated by Congress.396  This assumption depends upon a specific—but unjusti-
fied—understanding of the relationship between the rights secured by the
Constitution and the people’s capacity to enforce those rights directly.  The
idea that Congress must act as an intermediator for citizens who seek to
enforce the substantive provisions of the Constitution depends upon an
393 See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 189 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
394 See Teachout, supra note 1, at 361, 366.
395 Cf. EISEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 22 (“[A]t least one prominent leader in the [consti-
tutional] ratification process saw violations of [the Emoluments] Clause as grounds for
impeachment.”).
396 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 104.
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unduly attenuated understanding of the role of “the People” in the develop-
ment of constitutional norms.397
The challenge of enforcing the Emoluments Clause illuminates the sur-
prisingly subordinate role that the Supreme Court has historically assigned
ordinary people within its separation-of-powers narrative.398  Despite the fact
that the constitutional text and contemporaneous writings by the Framers
and their contemporaries seem to contemplate a central role for what the
Constitution describes as “the People,” the Supreme Court has historically
been inclined to minimize the role that ordinary people play in the enforce-
ment—and, thereby, development—of constitutional norms.399  While the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal government are
each allocated unique enforcement powers within the Supreme Court’s sepa-
ration-of-powers narrative, the scope of the people’s constitutionally commit-
ted power to police the government remains unarticulated and undeveloped.
Instead, the Supreme Court and many constitutional scholars have generally
understood the people’s power to be divined and exercised almost exclu-
sively through the behavior of democratically elected representatives.400
This view of the people as subordinate or even irrelevant in terms of the
development of constitutional norms has been increasingly challenged by a
handful of scholars over the last decade.401  Scholars advancing an idea
known as “popular constitutionalism” have championed the view that ordi-
nary people should play a larger role in the development of constitutional
397 See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 208 (2004) (criticizing the subordinate role assigned to the people in
developing constitutional norms despite the fact that “[t]he Constitution was written
against a background of popular constitutionalism”).
398 See id. at 7 (describing the modern trend to reserve constitutional interpretation for
“elite to handle, subject to paramount supervision from the U.S. Supreme Court”).
399 See, e.g., St. George Tucker, Of Sovereignty and Legislature, in 1 BLACKSTONE’S COM-
MENTARIES app. at 3, 4 (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abra-
ham Small 1803) (“[T]he powers of the several branches of government are defined, and
the excess of them, as well in the legislature, as in the other branches, finds limits, which
cannot be transgressed without offending against the greater power from whom all author-
ity, among us, is derived; to wit, the PEOPLE.” (emphasis omitted)), reprinted in ST. GEORGE
TUCKER, VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 18, 19 (Liberty Fund 1999).
400 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (describing the politi-
cal process as the appropriate mechanism for ordinary citizens to demand enforcement of
constitutional norms against the political branches).
401 See Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: The Perils of Popular Constitution-
alism, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 673, 675 (“In the last several years, the trendiest development in
constitutional scholarship has prominent progressive scholars arguing against judicial
review. . . . This body of scholarship has acquired the label ‘popular constitutionalism,’
reflecting the notion of people—not judges—interpreting the Constitution.”); see also
Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 140 (2001) (“Everyone,
including everyone in Congress, agrees that the Constitution’s delegations have limits.
The question has always been deciding who should say what these limits are.” (emphasis
added)).
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norms.402  However, even those advocating popular constitutionalism have
largely imagined the role of the people to be mediated by elected
representatives.403
While aligned with the view that ordinary people have a role to play in
developing constitutional norms, this Article takes the idea of “popular con-
stitutionalism” in a different direction.  Rather than primarily equating the
collective will of the people with the behavior of elected bodies or officials,
this Article argues that the Constitution contemplates a role in separation-of-
powers analysis for direct action by individual people to enforce—and thereby
develop—constitutional norms through the judicial process.
The capacity for individual citizens to frame constitutional questions is
especially compelling when a constitutional violation affects all the people in
the same way.  When a people’s provision is violated, all of the people are
simultaneously and equally victimized.  No individual is harmed more than
another.  In that context, mediating constitutional norms through a repre-
sentative body makes sense only if that representative body were somehow
able to approximate an absolutely perfect proxy for the will of each of the
people—a proxy that is somehow inexplicably superior to the direct exercise
of the power to enforce the Clause by individual citizens.
Representative constitutionalism, however, falls far short of that ideal.
Actions undertaken by representative bodies are, of course, not coterminous
with the will of each of the people.404  It is axiomatic to state that actions by
representative bodies fail to perfectly reflect the will of each of the people.
Minimally, actions by representative bodies are, obviously, a representative
rather than a direct democratic phenomenon.405  Actions by representative
bodies are instead the result of complex processes of mediation and consen-
sus in which some views prevail and others do not.406  Further, many people
who are undoubtedly part of “the People” for the purpose of constitutional
402 See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 180–81
(1999) (describing and advocating what he calls “populist constitutional law,” in which,
among other things, the people amend the constitution through the political process
rather than the Supreme Court amending it exclusively through constitutional
interpretation).
403 See KRAMER, supra note 397, at 7 (“[I]t was ‘the people themselves’—working
through and responding to their agents in the government—who were responsible for
seeing that [the Constitution] was properly interpreted and implemented.”); TUSHNET,
supra note 402, at 186 (“Populist constitutional law returns constitutional law to the peo-
ple, acting through politics.”).
404 See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2390 (2003)
(“[T]he precise lines drawn by any statute may reflect unrecorded compromises among
interest groups, unknowable strategic behavior, or even an implicit legislative decision to
forgo costly bargaining over greater textual precision.”).
405 By way of contrast, a ballot referendum represents a closer approximation of a
direct democratic phenomenon than an action by Congress, yet even a ballot referendum
serves as an imperfect proxy for the will of the people due to disenfranchisement and low
voter participation, among other problems.
406 Manning, supra note 404, at 2390 (describing the legislative process as “complex”
and “opaque”).
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protections are excluded (by law or by circumstance) from the electoral pro-
cess.  Children, prisoners, and noncitizen residents, for example, all have a
stake equal in safeguarding the United States from potentially treacherous
foreign influence, yet none of these individuals are able to directly influence
the composition of Congress.
Thus, as a conceptual matter, it is both facile and inaccurate to assume—
as a preference for representative constitutionalism in this context must—
that action or inaction by Congress to enforce the Emoluments Clause repre-
sents a safeguarding of constitutional values that is commensurate to or
reflective of the will of the people themselves.
Similarly, as a pragmatic matter, there is ample reason to conclude that
representative constitutionalism is particularly poorly suited for safeguarding
the constitutional values implicated by the Emoluments Clause in particular.
A consideration of that concern follows.
C. Direct Constitutionalism and Fiduciary Injury
In addressing the novel question of standing in the emoluments context,
the Court will face the three options previously discussed: (1) a broad, qui
tam–like grant of standing; (2) the preclusion of private standing and reli-
ance instead on Congress to enforce the Clause; or (3) a grant of standing
exclusively to attenuated collateral injuries.  In assessing these options, the
Court may consider whether there exists an emoluments-specific reason to
prefer representative constitutionalism in this novel context.  An emolu-
ments-specific preference for representative constitutionalism could conceiv-
ably be based on one of the following premises: (1) the Constitution itself—
either structurally, expressly, or in light of the Framers’ intent—requires col-
lective rather than individual enforcement of the Clause; or (2) collective
action is pragmatically better suited to safeguard the fiduciary duty enforced
by the Clause.
With respect to the first premise, the Clause does not express a prefer-
ence for collective action in the context of Emoluments enforcement.
Instead, the Clause is silent on the matter of enforcement.  William Rawle,
for example, writing in 1825, noted that the lack of an enforcement provision
was the great weakness of the Emoluments Clause.407
Further, while the Clause does identify a role for collective action (i.e.,
accepting an emolument is only a violation if it is done without the consent of
Congress), the role it identifies is not an enforcement role.408  It does not,
for example, state that violation of the Clause is an impeachable offence, or a
407 See RAWLE, supra note 21, at 116 (“[T]he clause in the text is defective in not provid-
ing a specific penalty for a breach of it.”)
408 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
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“high crime” or “misdemeanor,” which might signal enforcement of the
Clause exclusively through the political process.409
The history of the Clause likewise fails to support an exclusively collec-
tive (rather than individual) remedy for its violation.410  What we know about
contemporaneous discussion of the provision suggests that the Framers
viewed as a grave threat the possibility that a federal officer would be ren-
dered vulnerable to foreign influence.411  The seriousness of the threat and
the absence of a specified remedy supports—if anything—the inference that
all reasonable enforcement mechanisms would be made available to police
the fiduciary duty of federal officers.
Neither the text of the Clause nor its history suggests or requires that
collective action through elected representatives (i.e., impeachment) is the
exclusive (or even preferred) mechanism for enforcing the Clause.  We are
left then with the premise that collective action is pragmatically better suited
to enforce the fiduciary duty at issue.
Yet, as a pragmatic matter, direct constitutionalism is better suited to
safeguard the fiduciary duty embedded in the Emoluments Clause.  Recall
the discussion presented in Section I.B about the duty of loyalty imposed by
the Emoluments Clause as an analogue to a CEO’s duty of loyalty to a corpo-
ration.  In that context, the agency law makes the fullest panoply of legal
mechanisms available to enforce the fiduciary duty.412  Individual sharehold-
ers are empowered to directly sue to enforce the duty.413  Agency law could
be more circumspect in conferring standing in this context, allowing, for
example, the duty of loyalty to be enforced exclusively by action by the board
of directors—a type of representative rather than direct enforcement of the
duty.  However, the broader grant of standing is justified in light of the seri-
ousness the threat of a disloyal leader poses to the existence and well-being of
the company.414  Moreover, it is plausible that members of the board of
directors may have incentive not to stop the disloyalty due to countervailing
self-interested concerns.415  This classic agency problem is resolved in the
409 Cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of
the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”).
410 See Teachout, supra note 1, at 366.
411 Id.
412 See Myers, supra note 92, at 474–75 (“The threat of a fiduciary suit can deter man-
agement misconduct, and this deterrence rationale is regarded as the chief justification for
shareholder suits.” (footnote omitted)).
413 DeMott, supra note 89, at 920.
414 See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 996 (2d Cir. 1983)
(“[T]he function of [an action founded on breach of fiduciary duty] . . . is not merely to
compensate the plaintiff for wrongs committed by the defendant but . . . ‘to prevent them,
by removing from agents and trustees all inducement to attempt dealing for their own
benefit in matters which they have undertaken for others, or to which their agency or trust
relates.’” (alterations and omissions in original) (quoting Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248
N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969))).
415 Myers, supra note 92, at 474–75.
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context of agency law by allowing shareholders to directly ask courts to
decide whether the CEO has violated his fiduciary duty.416
The same pragmatic reasoning supports direct constitutionalism in the
context of an Emoluments Clause violation.  The classic agency problem
presented by a potentially conflicted board of directors417 exists with equal
(if not much greater) force in the context of Congress.  There are innumera-
ble reasons why Congress may be ill equipped to safeguard the country from
the looming threat of a disloyal President.  Members of Congress may, for
example, be constrained from acting to enforce the Clause by political con-
flicts of interest, unclean hands, or a free-rider problem.418
This classic agency problem is best resolved as it is in the context of
other fiduciary duties: by a broad conferral of standing.419  In light of the
seriousness of the risk to the well-being of the United States that is posed by a
disloyal federal officer, allowing a kind of qui tam standing (similar to the
conferral of standing in the Establishment Clause context) is the appropriate
way to safeguard the important constitutional values at stake in the emolu-
ments context.
A primary-injury model of constitutional standing provides a coherent
and justifiable means of conceptualizing standing across constitutional con-
texts.  Moreover, in addition to providing conceptual coherence to a doctri-
nal area which is notoriously inconsistent, a primary-injury model safeguards
separation-of-powers values by focusing attention on the constitutional prom-
ise at issue rather than the causal contrails of collateral injuries.420  A pri-
mary-injury model fosters the optimum degree of judicial restraint by only
militating in favor of judicial intervention when the constitutional promise
itself requires it.
Yet, despite representing a significant shift in thinking about constitu-
tional injuries, a primary-injury model of constitutional standing would not
represent a sea change in standing outcomes.  A brief consideration follows
of what might—and might not—change in the context of a primary-injury
model of constitutional standing.
IV. A PRIMARY-INJURY MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING
Adoption of a primary-injury model of constitutional standing embodies
a substantial reconceptualization of constitutional injury, yet it would likely
416 See DeMott, surpa note 89, at 920.
417 Garten, supra note 95, at 588 (“Since the preferences of managers and shareholders
diverge, a classic agency problem develops.”).
418 See David Orentlicher, Conflicts of Interest and the Constitution, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
713, 762–65 (2002) (providing examples of various conflicts of interest that might motivate
congressional action)
419 See DeMott, supra note 89, at 920.
420 See Laura A. Cisneros, Standing Doctrine, Judicial Technique, and the Gradual Shift from
Rights-Based Constitutionalism to Executive-Centered Constitutionalism, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1089, 1093 (2009) (describing standing doctrine as “more than three decades of tortured
constitutional discourse”).
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only represent a modest alteration of existing standing outcomes.  In the con-
text of individual-rights provisions, for example, a primary-injury model
would represent very little (if any) change in standing outcomes, as the Court
has long tacitly embraced a primary-injury model in that context.421
In the context of political-entity provisions, a primary-injury model of
constitutional standing would focus attention on the underlying constitu-
tional promise and invite inquiry into the content of that promise.  In this
context, a primary-injury model is not likely to upset many existing standing
determinations, although a primary-injury model may, on some occasions,
remove standing from collaterally injured citizen-plaintiffs in favor of prima-
rily injured political entities, depending on the resolution of antecedent
questions about the content of constitutional provisions.422
For example, in 1996, Congress passed the Line Item Veto Act, and the
day after it went into effect six members of Congress (who had voted against
the Act) filed a suit423 alleging that the Act violated the Presentment
Clause.424  The Supreme Court applied the CAP rule to deny standing, find-
ing that the Congress members had failed to allege a sufficiently concrete
and particularized harm.425  When the President later used the line-item veto
to remove a category of liability protections from a budget bill, the Supreme
Court found that individual plaintiffs who lost the benefit of those protec-
tions had standing to sue under the theory that the line-item veto violated
the Presentment Clause.426
Thus, in the Presentment Clause context the Court found the operative
question to be whether the plaintiffs alleged a concrete and particularized
injury.427  However, under a primary-injury model of constitutional standing,
the operative question would center on whether the Presentment Clause has
promised that the plaintiff would not be injured in the manner that she has
been injured.  In this way, focus is directed at the content of the constitu-
tional promise itself.  One way of framing the question is whether the Pre-
sentment Clause promises that plaintiffs would not lose their liability
protection in the manner that they did.  The Presentment Clause does make
421 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138–39 (1978) (standing in the context of the Fourth
Amendment is coterminous with the substantive guarantees of the Fourth Amendment
itself); see also supra subsection II.B.2.
422 The converse would not occur because if a primary injury does not lie with a politi-
cal entity, the provision is not a political-entity provision.  It is instead a people’s provision
or an individual-rights provision.
423 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 814–16 (1997).
424 U.S CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; id.
425 Raines, 521 U.S. at 828 (“There would be nothing irrational about a system that
granted standing in [cases like the one at bar]; some European constitutional courts oper-
ate under one or another variant of such a regime. . . . But . . . [o]ur regime contemplates
a more restricted role for Article III courts, well expressed by Justice Powell in his concur-
ring opinion in United States v. Richardson . . . .”).
426 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421–23 (1998).  The Court found that
there were other, similar bases for standing as well. Id. at 430–31.
427 Raines, 521 U.S. at 820, 830.
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a promise to the plaintiffs who lost their liability protections (along with all
the people) to safeguard certain democratic values.  In particular, the Pre-
sentment Clause promises that no law will be enacted in the absence of
bicameralism and presentment (which the Court found absent in the context
of the line-item veto).428  The injury that would seem to mirror that promise
is an undifferentiated character-of-government harm—the kind of harm that
attends every constitutional violation.  While it is possible that the COG harm
is the primary harm (in which case the Presentment Clause is a people’s pro-
vision), the Clause also makes a more specific set of promises.
The more specific set of promises made by the Presentment Clause is
directed to the President and the Congress, that each will have an irreducible
role to play in the enactment of legislation.429  A plausible rendering of the
primary harm under the Presentment Clause then is harm that the President
or Congress suffers when they are denied their constitutionally committed
role in the legislative process.430  In this light, a primary-injury model of con-
stitutional standing might confer standing to the members of Congress who
object to the line-item veto while withholding it from the members of the
public who were collaterally injured by its application.431  Yet because a pri-
mary-injury model is generally consistent with the Court’s constitutional
standing sensibilities, reversals such as these would likely constitute the
exception rather than the rule.
In the context of a people’s provision, such as the Emoluments Clause, a
primary-injury model would confer a qui tam standing to those among the
people who wish to challenge an alleged violation.  In applying a primary-
injury model in the Emoluments Clause context, a court would first identify
the fiduciary injury that is the primary injury following from a violation of the
Clause.  Having identified the primary injury and determining it to be an
undifferentiated injury, a court would next do as the Supreme Court has
often done in the Establishment Clause context and assume, without analysis,
that standing exists to challenge an alleged emoluments violation.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, requiring plaintiffs to jump through the hoop of “con-
crete” and “particularized” injury in the context of an Emoluments Clause
lawsuit serves no substantive purpose.  The CAP rule fails to provide mean-
ingful quantitative or qualitative limits on constitutional standing, and it like-
wise fails to advance separation-of-powers priorities.  Further, requiring
428 See U.S CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448–49.
429 U.S CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of
the United States . . . .”).
430 See id.
431 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 814; see also id. at 831–32 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment)
(stating that “simply claiming harm to the[ ] interest in having government abide by the
Constitution, which would be shared to the same extent by the public at large,” would
“provide no basis for suit”).
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collaterally injured token plaintiffs demeans the constitutional value that the
Emoluments Clause represents: the value of fidelity to the people of the
United States as against foreign influence.
A preference for representative constitutionalism in the context of an
emoluments challenge is also misplaced.  Channeling emoluments cases
toward the political branches runs the risk that Congress will act in its own
self-interest rather than exclusively in the interest of the people or of the
republic.  There is also much reason to doubt that Congress is more compe-
tent than the judiciary to resolve questions about the nature of the fiduciary
duty that lies at the heart of the Emoluments Clause.  More importantly, the
risk posed by a disloyal federal officer is so serious that all avenues for enforc-
ing the duty of loyalty imposed by the Emoluments Clause should be made
available.  Direct, rather than representative, constitutionalism would priori-
tize the primary fiduciary injury that follows from an emoluments violation
while simultaneously maximizing the likelihood that a violation will be
redressed.
A uniform primary-injury model of constitutional standing would pro-
vide a true qualitative limit on standing in constitutional cases.  It would also
bring coherence and parsimony to a doctrinal area that is very much in need
of it.  A primary-injury model would avoid the unjustifiable and inconsistent
standing outcomes that necessarily accompany the application of the CAP
rule, particularly in the context of undifferentiated primary injuries.  A pri-
mary-injury model would likewise result in a direct, rather than representa-
tive, approach to undifferentiated constitutional injuries.  As such, a primary-
injury model would afford the people a direct role in the development of
important constitutional values.
The emoluments controversies of the present moment will test the
boundaries and internal consistency of the Supreme Court’s current
approach to citizen suits as a mechanism for redressing primary, undifferenti-
ated public harms.  The cases currently pending provide an opportunity for
the Court to reconsider the wisdom and efficacy of its current approach,
while opening the door to navigating a new doctrinal path in this important,
complex, and controversial area of constitutional law.
